Research On Double Remedies In Anti-dumping And Countervailing Measures

In2006，the United States reserved its long-standing policy prohibiting the simultaneousimposition of anti-dumping duties （ADDs）and Countervailing duties（CVDs）againstnonmarket economies. Subsequently, the United States has imposed concurrent ADDsand CVDs in numerous cases against China. China challenged a number of aspects ofthe US practice, most notably the double-remedies issue, which occurs when domesticsubsidies is offset by both ADD and CVD. The Appellate Body (AB) correctly ruledthat double remedies are inconsistently with the Agreement on Subsidies andCountervailing Measurements（SCM） and that the burden was on the investigationauthorities to ensure that double remedies were not being imposed，however, the ABlargely limited its discussion to measurements concerns, an approach involving othermethods for computing normal value. A longstanding policy first adopted by the USDepartment of Commence(USDOC) and affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for theFederal Circuit(CAFC) in the Georgetown Steel case,followed by the US Court ofInternational Trade(CIT) and CAFC in Coated Free Sheet Paper case,is that USDOCshould use a methodology which ensure that double-remedies issue would nothappen.The ADD/CVD rules provided by GATT/WTO are related.With the AB’sconclusion that the articles note the anti-dumping and countervailing duties tocompensate for the situation of dumping or subsidization are allow to purge the effect ofgovernment involvement on prices， in order to protect domestic industry.Theinvestigating authority should refrain double counting.This essay shows that thesimplified US’s NME methodology for calculating dumping margin and pass-throughcan lead to double-remedy,which is illegal, by clearly addressing the logic of thepass-through， how can domestic subsidies affect the prices.In addition,the newcountervailing-duty statute to allow CVD law to be applied against imports from NMEsretroactively covering all proceedings since first.This amendment also purportedlyresolves the double-remedy problems,allowing USDOC to make adjustments,whichseem hard to find a conclusion and unlikely to be good for the disputes.Further the ABmay have inadvertently set the stage for a slew of new double-remedies claims by usingArticle19.3of SCM,at this level,the choice seems like a reasonable compromise.Wemust face more double-remedy challenges in future.