On The Antitrust Misbehaves Related To The Resale Of Mobile Service

After a brief introduction of the resale policy on the mobile service industry, the author goes on to analyze the relationship between the mobile virtual network operators(MVNOs)and the mobile network operators(MNOs). Then the paper goes deeper with a detailed analysis on the market position of the market players based on the network characteristic of the mobile industry based on which she presents a preview of the potential antitrust misbehaves.This dissertation consists of six main parts.Introduction brings up the topic and shows the outcome of current research as well as what is creative in the article and the short-comes. This part also shows the specific antitrust issues that will be talked in this dissertation by eliminating administrative monopoly and mergers that might harm competition.Part I starts with the concept of resale of mobile service and related operators. Then the author goes on with the competitive affects of the resale policy and the definition of relevant market and the relationships between different market players on different phase of the operation. It was found that the relationship between MNOs and MVNOs varies, they are both counterpart and competitors----they are counterpart in the network entry phase but competitors when talking about the resale of mobile service. The author also found that the participation of MVNOs into the mobile market might bring up new misbehaves that harm will harm competition while it might promote competition. The author go further by a brief introduction of potential misbehaves.Part II focuses on abuse of dominant market power by MNOs. The author talks mainly about the types and manifestations of the such abuse by arguing that MNOs might try to impede competition by refusing to offer access to MVNOs or might abuse its market power by charging excessively high or offering poor mobile service to MVNOs so as to harm the competition in the aftermarket.Part III focuses on resale related cartels between mobile services market players. The author mainly talked about horizontal cartels between MNOs especially those on price of access, and vertical cartels between MVNOs and MNOs such as restrict of resale price.Part IV focuses on the regulation cooperation between industry regulators and antitrust enforcers based on the network dependence of mobile service as well as an abstract of characteristics of the misbehaves in mobile services industry.The Conclusion strengthens the necessity and positive effect of the new resale system and highlights the need for the competition authority to keep alert of resale related potential negative influence.