Rescue Police Of The French Government To The Troubled Financial Institutions And Its Coordination With The EU Law

The rescue of their domestic financial institutions in problem in different statesis basically in line with the choice of the greater one of two values, thereby takingartificial measures to reduce the enormous loss of domestic financial markets andinvestors caused by any of the bankruptcy of troubled financial institutions and lettingthose of which to go bankruptcy. However, commentators have noted that the resultsof the rescue to troubled financial institutions often inconsistent with good wishes, iemost of which have failed. This is especially true for financial institutions lying in thelarger and core position in the financial system, because of their complicatedrelationship often indeed affect the whole body, even its influence goes beyond theeconomic sphere, penetrating into the political field, so the rescue often related topolitical factors.This paper selects the French rescue to the Credit Lyonnais as an analysis object,a detailed analysis on the verge of bankruptcy through the process of cause and stateaid have also come to the idea of failure for the rescue. Before the Credit Lyonnaiscrisis, it had experienced frenzied expansion process, while its risk control ability hasgreatly lagged behind of its expansion, it went as if it was a runaway horse.Meanwhile the government’s supervision of banks at the moment was mere aformality, and the deterioration of the business environment at home and abroad have motivated the financial hole deeper and deeper. The French government lack thoroughanalysis of the crisis situation and blindly rescued the bank, in which only thegovernment inject reached tens of billions, and up to as many as three times ans aidplans also changed several times. However, even with state rescue of such a scale, theloss of the bank outreached more than a hundred billion. The aid not only generated aheavy burden to the French taxpayers, but also brought a great strike to the order ofcompetition in France and the EU financial markets. The legislation inadequacy, thedisorder of rescue measures and and the lack of the pursuing of full responsibilities tothose responsible officers of the bank and relevant government officials during thecrisis are worthy studying.Unlike a single country, the appear of the EU regional economies seems to bringa new hope for the state bailout. It tries to establish and maintain a unified fair marketeconomic competition order, putting “shackles” on state aids, so as to say goodbye tothe times that the EU member states easily subsidized domestic financial institutionswith state resources. The later development of strictly limited state aid, minimizationof the distortion to the competition in the market, procedure stages of rescue measures,strict examination and approval of the bailout and so on indicate their deepeningunderstanding of the nature of state aid,which greatly manifested in rescuing processduring the financial crisis in2008. Compared with the U.S.“Dodd-Frank Act”, theinternational rescue package of state aid to troubled financial institutions arebecoming more and more mature.Finally, through a brief historical review of the policy and its method of staterescue to troubled financial institutions in China, some shortcomings existed in aidprograms has been noted. Combined with the development of rescue policies inFrance, European Union and United States, some suggestions in the process ofbuilding a legal system for state rescue are provided.