The Role South Africa In Conflict Resolution: Comparative Analysis Of Burundi And Cote D’lvoire

Burundi which has experienced a series of coups since independence, wasengulfed in protracted conflicts where direct violence was systematically employedoften targeted at civilians between members of Hutu and Tutsi ethnic group, until theearly1990’s. Cote d’Ivoire, a relatively more peaceful state, has also had its share ofcoups which did not result in violence in society. In September2002however, therewas anattempted coup which threatened to remove Gbagbo from power. Althoughitproved unsuccessful, it succeeded in turning simmering tensions into a low-gradewar with fewer casualties, as compared to Burundi. The violence in C te d’Ivoireresembled low-intensity warfare which targeted soldiers as well as civilians.The nature of conflict in both Burundi and Cote d’Ivoire ischaracterised byidentity issues that penetrated into the fabrics of society and were manipulated by thedistribution of political power and economic wealth. They present a typical exampleof how discrimination and unequal access to scarce resources create tensions insocieties which can lead to violence. As the discrimination took place largely becauseof identity, the violence and counter-violence became ethnic too, having a Tutsi hacka Hutu while Ivorians were pitied against etrangers(foreigner). Both are a case ofsuperimposition of social cleavages, with fault lines in political power, economicwealth, and ethnicity reinforcing each other.Gurr treats them both as "ethnoclass" conflicts; Harff categorizes them as"politicides against politically active communal groups"; and Stavenhagen treats themas “resulting from the overlap of both socioeconomic and ethnic divisions.” Violencefeatured prominently in the case studies perpetrated by both the government andrebels. In both countries the military played a role in supporting the conflict byintervening on behalf of the government to contain domestic insurgencies.South Africa as a regional leader was pressed to secure peace and stability by theinternational community. Its first peacekeeping endeavour in Burundi from1999to2010proved to be a success; yielding a peaceful settlement and facilitating transitioninto a democracy. In2004South Africa was invited into the peace process in Coted’Ivoire after conflict had broken out following an attempted coup. Despite the lowintensity of the war it fared less successful in the peace process. South Africa has since found itself under the scrutiny of many states. Itsinconsistent performance in conflict resolution endeavours has led many to questionits ability to lead the continent. Although it carries the obvious stature of a regionalpower owing to its strong economy and flourishing democracy,its conflict resolutionabilities have failed to match those expected of a regional leader.This paper shows it was not the level of difficulty of the conflict or a lack ofskills or resources that failed South Africa. However, the context within which thepeace process took place frustrated South Africa’s efforts. The key challenge forSouth Africa as the chief mediator was to be a gate-keeper between the actual processand the many observers, special envoys and regional and global states that wanted toinfluence the process. It had a good grasp on the Burundi negotiations as it was able toprotect the process from being manipulated by external pressure. Furthermore,garnered international support to impose sanctions to expedite the peace process.Within the two years’ participation in Cote d’Ivoire, however, South Africafound itself overwhelmed by an unsupportive environment: regional interferencesfrom political entrepreneurs that benefited from the conflict, diplomatic tensions overregional leadership with Nigeria and Senegal that insisted on the primacy ofECOWAS in the negotiations, and Cote d’Ivoire’s post-colonial ties with France. Itsefforts to achieve its mandate as the chief mediator were hindered by anunaccommodating environment marred with regional politics and great power antics.This thesis shows that it was the hostile environment with a proliferation ofexternal actors that undermined the potential success of South Africa’s role in thepeace process of Cote d’Ivoire.