Non-compliance With The FLEGT Agreement In Republic Of Congo

When public concern about an international environmental problem is strong enough to require action, government often respond by negotiating a treaty. In April 2002, the European commission hosted an international workshop to discuss how the EU should combat illegal logging. Being one of the largest importers of timber and forest products, the EU therefore considers that international cooperation is imperative to dealing with environmental problems. Illegal logging causes environmental damage, retards sustainable development, costs government billions in lost revenue, promotes corruption and undermines the rule of law. The symbiotic relationship between illegal logging and corruption is particularly relevant in Republic of Congo where the estimate level of illegal logging could be as high as 70%.Corruption is one of the most serious obstacles for ecosystem management and biodiversity conservation.About half of Congolese timber reaching the EU is thought to be illegal, with Italy, France, Spain and Portugal being the main importers. The Republic of Congo exports some US$330 million worth of timber annually. The implementation of the VPA has been very slow in Congo. It is important to note that it’s not all core multilateral environmental agreements that provide facilities and support to countries to enable them to enforce their laws more effectively at the national level. This thesis seeks to find out why the Republic of Congo doesn’t comply with the FLEGT Agreement.The paper proceeds as follows. We review two prominent compliance approaches in the International Relations literature based on the rational choice theory.First of all, most states want to play a role in the international arena, and one way to enhance their position is by drawing on their international reputation; therefore, improving state’s reputation is an instrumental goal for increasing their bargaining powers among other states. A state that is known to honor its commitments will find more partners when it seeks to enter into future cooperative arrangements, and will be able to solve more problems of cooperation than will a state that has a less favorable reputation. However, States which are not actively seeking to elevate their international prestige and reputation do not have a strong internal drive to satisfy the international community. For such states, the material costs of compliance will be more important than social rewards by international organizations for their compliance. Since these states do not receive any material rewards for enforcing the agreement, they are not motivated by social rewards; we can expect that their levels of compliance will be quite low. By signing the FLEGT VPA, the EU has to provide support to producer countries to enforce this agreement. If the cost of compliance is too important for the Republic of Congo to bear that, even if the Congolese government has the will to comply will the law, they are not going to do it.The second point is that, when making a decision, people first weigh the likely positive benefits against likely negative consequences, and then base their choice on what they think will ultimately benefit them the most. Illegal logging is directly link to corruption. Weak states, fragmented governments have a precarious hold on power and are characterized by political instability, anarchy and local fiefdoms. The rule of law is really low in Republic of Congo. While strong governments attempt to maximize total bribe revenue from a number of complementary legal transactions; Under weak governments such as the Congolese government, the private sector has a better opportunity to lower costs through collusive corruption. This collusive corruption also suits government officials, who given the political instability which characterizes weak governments, are anxious to maximize short term personal benefits, rather than building up government revenues. If the FLEGT Action plan presents more benefit or outcome, the Republic of Congo would comply because it will benefit both of them. But if they don’t have any benefit from this agreement, then they’re not going to comply with it, even if they want to build a good reputation at the international level.We conclude that the Republic of Congo doesn’t have necessary resources (financial, administrative, and technical) to comply with the FLEGT agreement. Monitoring and enforcement of forest law is hugely under-resourced in Congo. A compliance cost is expenditure of time or money in conforming to the legislation requirements. If an agreement is of little value to a state and produces only small outcomes, the slightest increase in compliance costs will lead to defection. States enter into international agreements in terms of which they agree to enforce certain obligations within their own national legal systems, but nation-states alone are responsible for complying with the law. The Republic of Congo doesn’t comply with the FLEGT VPA because they are not able to bear the costs of compliance. By increasing external constraints, states alter strategic cost-benefit calculations of states and lead to a change of their preferences over strategies eventually resulting in compliance. A relationship that yields a higher outcome or benefit will not be disrupted by such a minor fluctuation in costs because compliance still produces a positive net benefit. It follows that, in general, states will defect from low-net-benefit relationship more frequently than they will from high-benefit relationships. As long as the EU commission would not be able to provide financial support including necessary resources to the Republic of Congo, the level of compliance will stay low. This implies that in treaties where the benefits of cooperation are excludable, reputation tends to protect powerful states the most, since large states are most likely to lie at the center of the most valued cooperative relationships. The Republic of Congo would comply with the FLEGT agreement to the extent that doing so is cost-justified.