The Study On Government’s Behaviors And The Efficiency Of Financial Institutions In Agriculture-related Loans In Rural Financial System Vicissitude

The rural economy has become the “short board” for the economic development in our country as a result of its backward development, and its capital demand is increasing day by day. Therefore, reinforcing financial support, increasing fund supply and improving the efficiency of financial institutions in agriculture-related loans are necessary for the development of rural economy. However, the rural financial system has been resulting in the vast outflow of rural fund, and the rural finance can’t play a good role in supporting the development of rural economy. What’s more, under the compulsory system vicissitude in our country, our government dominates the rural financial system vicissitude to a large extent. Obviously, it is necessary to analyze government’s behaviors in rural financial system vicissitude, so that the rural financial system can evolve in the direction of improving the efficiency of agriculture-related loans and reinforcing financial support.First, review the relevant literature at home and abroad to summarize conclusions up to now and look for the perspective in this paper; study the basic theory of system vicissitude, the government’s behaviors in system vicissitude and efficiency to clarify the theoretical logic of normative analysis and built the theory base for this paper. Secondly,collect data relevant to government’s behaviors and agriculture-related loans in rural financial system vicissitude to built the practice foundation for this paper and find the existing problem, which may become the orientation of following analysis. Thirdly,analyze the government’s behaviors in the vicissitude oriented by the problem, based on the practice foundation and following the theoretical logic. Fourthly, use the method of three-stage DEA connected with Malmquist index to analyze the influence of government’s behaviors on the efficiency of financial institutions in agriculture-related loans in rural financial system vicissitude, and empirically test the possible reason of the decline of agriculture-related loans growth rate. Finally, put forward corresponding suggestions toimprove the efficiency.Through the study of basic theory, this paper summaries the theoretical logic:government takes initiative supply of rural financial system according to her goals and takes passive supply due to the restraint of interest group. By analyzing the practice foundation, this paper finds that the growth rate of agriculture-related loans is declining.Through normative analysis, the following conclusions can be drawn: the more strengthening in efficiency, the more weakening in rent of government’s preference in rural financial system vicissitude, therefore, our government not only pays attention to the increase of agriculture-related loans in short-term, but also pays high attention to the promotion of operating efficiency in long-term; the strengthening preference in efficiency contributes to the improvement of rural financial institutions’ operating efficiency; the conflict between the increase of agriculture-related loans and the promotion of operating efficiency is unavoidable in short-term; the promotion of operating efficiency is in favor of the allocation of agriculture-related fund in long-term; the supply of rural financial system under the restraint of interest group is not good for the promotion of operating efficiency,but its influence on agriculture-related loans is uncertain; the government’s strengthening preference in efficiency and the interest group’s restraint are two theoretical reasons for the decline. Through empirical analysis, this paper draws the following conclusions: the whole influence of government’s behaviors on the efficiency of financial institutions in agriculture-related loans in rural financial system vicissitude is negative; the higher realization degree of government’s efficiency preference in system and institutions’ operating efficiency, the more unfavorable to the increase of agriculture-related loans; but the enhancement of government’s subjective efficiency preference will encourage the allocation of agriculture-related fund; the restraint of interest group is not good for the increase of agriculture-related loans.