Research On The Progress Of Non-direct Stakeholder Involved Incidents Based On Game Theory

China is in a period of economic and social transformation, through more than 30 years of economic growth and social development, various accumulated contradictions are gradually highlighting. Social resources structure, social regional structure, social organizational structure and identity structure are also in the event of significant changes, so the differentiation of classes groups and organizations make the interests awareness awakening and strengthening. Result of the limited social conditions, diverse interest groups will inevitably compete or even conflict with each other. Meanwhile, the inadequate of expression mechanisms and coordination mechanisms of the interest, mass consciousness’ weak rule of law, which will intensify the contradictions between diverse interest groups, is easily cause the mass incidents. Additionally, the rapid popularization highly and development speed of the Internet are showing a new close interaction trend in social reality space with the network virtual space. In recent years,the reason why the majority of mass incidents in the process of evolution often have been intensified, it was that it involved by a large number of non-direct stakeholder, which has become to an important factor that cannot be ignored. From the perspective of evolutionary game theory, this article analyzes the scenario of some typical mass incident and discusses the strategy decisions, payoff, and evolution mechanism in different stages. By analyzing the motivation of non-direct stakeholders intervene into the mass incident, it takes the information strength of non-direct stakeholders to the evolutionary game copy dynamic equations and analyzes the influence of the information intensity and direction to the stable strategy, discusses the strategy selection of two players in game event selection, also. The case studies show that the strength and presence of non-direct stakeholders’ intervention in the event can impact its stable strategy. Finally this article analyzes the application and research extension of the game model with non-direct stakeholder involvement.