Game Analysis Of Interest Subjects Related To Environmental Tax

Levying of environmental tax is the key component of building a green tax systemin China, is an important content of deepening the reformation of financial and taxsystem further. But the reality is although the levying of environment tax has beendiscussed for many years, but relevant policy has not issued. The reason of currentsituation is not the slowness of central policies, but the levying of environmental taxrefer to various areas, such as political, economic, social and so on. Under thebackground of our country’s imperfect financial and tax system, the levying needovercome many obstructions. Levy of environmental tax should not only deal withpolicy transition and system improvement, but also to coordinate interest conflict wellin the process of levying. Form relaxing interest conflicts perspective, this articleattempts to supply suggest for the levy of environmental tax. Select stakeholders thatenvironmental tax levying involved in the internal of government as research object,straighten out the relationship of interest between the related subjects, find out theinterests imbroglio between the related subjects, and set up a game competition modelon the basis. Analyze the game competition model, find the policy factors that affect thebehavior of game-agent and affect the implementation of environmental tax, provide thefeasible reference suggestions for environmental tax levying.The game relationship between government internal interest subject involved in thelevy of environmental tax is more complex, in order to make the suggestion morespecific and targeted, in order to facilitate the analysis, reduce the internal interestsubject related the game to three pairs of two-game: the game between tax departmentand the environmental protection department, the game between central government andlocal government, the game between environmental protection department and financedepartment. Specific to different game relations, select several common method used ingame theory analysis. Game theory is based on the basis of individual rationality,especially in the non-cooperative game, each player is a pursuer for max individualinterests, profit maximization is player decision-making premise in non-cooperativegame. According to the player’s interest function, summarizing key factors what affectthe interests of the players, is a feasible way to solve the contradiction in the game. Inthe non-cooperative game, finding Nash equilibrium is also a kind of thought of solvingthe problem. By looking for Nash equilibrium, found that the key factors restrict gameplayers’ game strategy, adjust solutions according to these factors, remit the interest contradiction. In the non-cooperative game, individual rationality and collectiverationality is contradictory. Levy of environmental tax will overcome individualrationality and implement collective rationality, through formulating correspondingmeasures to improve the game relation, promote the non-cooperative game tocooperation game, maximizing the interests of the collective. In addition, when weanalyze game between inform-advantages and inform-disadvantages, we needPrincipal-agent Theory. By analyzing the policy factors that inform-advantages concern,establish appropriate incentive mechanism, reduce the interests lose ofinform-advantages as much as possible.On the analysis of the game between tax department and the environmentalprotection department, refer to the prisoner’s dilemma game model, use the method ofsolving Nash equilibrium in the game theory, find out the policy factors which influencethe two departments’ game strategy. Secondly, use the Principal-Agent Theory of thegame theory, construct the game competition model between central government andlocal government, straighten out the influence of division of administrative powers andtax power between central government and local government on the levy ofenvironmental tax. Finally, construct the revenue function between finance departmentand environmental protection department, assumption the game players are individualrationality, solve the optimal strategy function of both game players in the game. Bychanging the variable in the optimal strategy function, achieve the police effect that levyof environmental tax needed.Through the analysis of three pairs of game competition model, pinpoint theinterest balance of game-agent, sum up the policy measures that levy of environment taxneed focus and value. The interest balance of tax department and the environmentalprotection department is coordination and complementing each other’s advantages; theinterest balance of central government and local government is reasonable division ofadministrative power and tax power; the interest balance of finance department andenvironmental protection department is strict supervision and efficient use of financialfunds.In view of the interest equilibrium, put forward measures and suggestions aboutenvironmental tax. Suggestions related to environmental tax levying, can not leave areasonable division of administrative power and tax power, can not leave efficientutilization and effective supervision of financial fund, even can not leave thecoordination between different departments. Divide the scope of administrative power reasonably, distribute the finance power according to the administrative power, improvetransfer payment system, ensure the enthusiasm that local department participate inenvironmental tax levying, choose suitable way of environment tax collection andadministration, promote the complementary advantages environmental protectiondepartment and tax department; ensure special fund specially use, perfect thesupervision of funds, play the role of financial department in the levy of environmentaltax. Via these solutions, resolve the conflicts of interest between departments, promotethe process of environmental tax levying.Suggestions in this paper are based on the above three pairs of two-game, they aresome limitation and one-sidedness. Comprehensive and perfect measures should beestablished on multiple game between complex players. In addition, some measures arenot perfect, such as share ratio of environmental tax. These problems need to beimproved in future research. Finally, wish the analysis of environmental tax by thesemethods can provide reference for research and collecting the environmental tax.