| As a kind of performance evaluation of incentive mechanism,tournament used inso many areas such as salary management and promotion management, patent r&dcompetition, competition between local goverments. But most of previous researchfocused on the tournament in the static environment. In that mechanism, rules aremade in advance, and the agent should chose the fixed level of effort before the race.In reality, due to factors such as information disclosure, periodic summary,the agentwill adjust their own behavior according to the situation. So the dynamic tournamenthas attracted much more attentions of academic researchers because of its ownmulti-stage dynamic characteristics and information sharing, which can be morevividly reflects the real life.But the previous academic research on dynamic tournament mainly focused ontruly feedback to the agent, few scholar study the pricipal manipulating the information.One of the few about the manipulating information is focused on the effect ofinformation feedback on the agent, and they didn’t consider the effect of sabotage. Andthe agent maybe sabotage others in order to win in the dynamic tournament when theyknow some information about the performance. So we should explore the bestinformation feedback and the motivation of the principal.In order to enrich the content of research, we design7real effort experiment,which mainly study many kinds of factors influence on the agent’s effort and sabotage.And the factors conclude that whether the stage performance information is public,informing the agent slightly backward, slightly ahead or sharply behind the rivals.What’s more, we study whether the principal tamper with the performance informationin order to create a more competitive environment.By using real effort experimental studies on160subjects, we obtained thefollowing conclusions:(1) Compared with the closed information feedback, the agentwill adjust their strategy based on the situation in the truly feedback mechanism. In thiscase, the agent significantly increased effort level and has a reduction in sabotage.(2)Compared with the other information mechanism, informing the agent slightlybachward than their rivals is a mechaism which can stimulate the agent most. In thiscase, the agent’ performance is the highest, and the seconde stage’s effort level of theagent is also the highest.(3) Compared with the other information mechanism, informing the agent slightly ahead than their rivals is a mechaism which can bettercontrol the agent’s sabotage activity. In this case, the sabotage level of the agent is thelowest, and the agent’s performance is also better than one who in the truly feedbackmechanism.(4) Compared with the other information mechanism, informing the agentsharply behind than their rivals will make the worst situation in which the agent willreduce their effort level and increase their sabotage level.(5) The ranger of tamperingthe information of principal is not significantly affected by their deception aversion.(6)The higher self-efficacy of the agent, the higher effort level; The higher degree of fearof negative evaluation, the higher effort level also.(7) The agent who tend tocooperative has a lower sabotage level, but the sabotage behavior has not a significantrelationship with the agent’s attitude to risk.In summary, the stage performance information public can help the agent to adjusttheir behavior and improve their performance; the agent will increase the effort andreduce the sabotage level when they find that the performance gap between the rivaland themselves is not large. Although informing the agent sharply behind their rivalwill improve the agent’s effort level in the seconde stage, it also will waste the cost ofthe organization. Different information feedback strategy influence on the agent canprovide the theoretical reference for the enterprise personnel management. What’smore, the manager should consider the agent’s SE, personality type, and their attitudeto the FNE, risk, deception aversion, etc. |
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