Research On Two-stage Pricing Strategy Of Supply Chain Considering The Impact Of Quality Information Feedback

With the rapid development of social economy and the popularization of Internet technology,more and more platforms for consumers to share shopping experience after purchasing products are available.Participants on the market can more easily obtain product information on the market.Through consumer-generated product quality information feedback,consumers and companies can learn quality information of new products from the feedback of quality information.It is important for consumers and businesses to understand the quality information disseminated by consumers.Current research has shown that the existence of strategic consumers will have a very big impact on the profits of all members of the supply chain and decision-making,and ignoring the existence of strategic consumers will cause great losses to the sellers.Therefore,it is of great theoretical value and practical significance to study the feedback of quality information and the consumer's strategic behavior.How the members in the supply chain make decisions in the two-stage pricing to improve their profits.Based on the analysis of domestic and foreign literature research results,this paper addresses some of the deficiencies in existing research by using dynamic pricing,consumer strategy behavior and dynamic gaming,economics and other theories,from theoretical proof and simulation verification.This paper analyzes the formulation of pricing and ordering strategies for supply chain members under the influence of quality information feedback.The main research contents and findings are as follows:(1)Analyze the issue of the two-stage pricing strategy of a single monopolist vendor under the influence of quality information feedback during the second stage of product quality.Firstly,a decision model is established in which a single monopolist is affected by quality information feedback under the strategy-type consumer.Then,the profit model of the manufacturer without the feedback of quality information and the manufacturer's pricing strategy under the short-sighted consumer are analyzed.The study found that: When the quality scores generated by consumers meet certain conditions,the monopolist will update the quality in the second stage,otherwise it will not be updated.The higher the score of quality information generated,the smaller the number of sales in the first phase will be.(2)Under consideration of the existence of alternatives,the issue of pricing strategies under the influence of quality information feedback for two competing firms was studied.Firstly,the supply chain decision model of two competing firms is constructed,then thepricing strategy of the competing firms is compared and analyzed.Finally,the conclusions are verified by numerical simulation.The study found that when vendor A's strategy is low,vendor A's sales in the first phase will decrease,and profits will decline as the quality information score increases.Competitive company B's profits will be scored with quality information.Increase and increase.When firm A's strategy is relatively high,the company's sales in the first phase will increase,and profits will decline as the score of quality information increases,but the total profit obtained when the strategy is low is greater.B's profit also decreased as the quality information score increased.(3)Consider the three-level supply chain two-stage pricing decision model under the influence of quality information feedback.Firstly,a decentralized and centralized decision-making model in the three-level supply chain environment is constructed.Then the comparison of the pricing strategies of the two decision models is compared and the final numerical simulation results are verified.The study found that considering the feedback of quality information can give manufacturers or retailers better adjustments to pricing,retailers and manufacturers' profits will increase as the score of quality information increases.Therefore,in order to obtain consumer recognition To the extent that manufacturers should produce higher quality products,but also,manufacturers can appropriately control the dissemination of quality information and the content of information to obtain greater profits.