Matching Theory And Its Application In The Bank Credit Market Of China

Matching theory as the important branch of game theory,play an important role inpractice activities.Scholars mainly study about the existence of the stable matching, stablematching conditions of existence, the problem of stability matching collectioncharacteristics and strategies. Matching decision refers to the comprehensive measure eachparticipation main body part of the process requirements, achieve mutually satisfactorystability matching results through reasonable matching method.Matching theory played an important role in every practical field, this article willmatch theory applied to the bank credit market in China. In this paper, analyses the bankcredit market of China first.Then,research the changes of the credit market system and theproblems of market information asymmetry, adverse selection and moral hazard.Finally,analysis in both sides of the game strategy choice according to present situation of bankcredit market and the mechanism of the problem.Based on the above research results, I set some assumptions and compare each theutility function.It is concluded that companies and Banks in the credit markets strictpreference ordering list, using the deferred acceptance algorithm, it is concluded the resultsthat small and medium-sized Banks and small and medium-sized enterprises can stablematching, the big Banks and big companies can stable matching.But in reality, because theproblems of information asymmetry, moral hazard and adverse selection in the bank creditmarket matching process,cash flow tend to large enterprises, which leads to the excessiveconcentration of credit funds.Bank credit mechanism incentive is not enough and theexcessive regulation lead to the complicated inefficient allocation process.According to theactual situation, this article combined with the matching theory and puts forward somesuggestions to improve the our country bank credit mechanism.Introduction of matchingand clearing institutions, which set up by focusing on enterprises and banks bridge ofmatching process.It is not only can save approval process, simplify loan procedures, savethe time of loan, and can effectively prevent rent-seeking behavior, improve the efficiencyof resource allocation, but also can strengthen the supervision of enterprises and banks, establish a credit reporting system. Compared to before match results, which can betterrealize the resource allocation more efficient.