The Study On Stock Options Incentive Of Listed Companies In China

In the process of enterprises’development, agent problems become one of the important factors which restrict the development of the enterprises. The traditional agent problem stems from the separation of management and ownership. While managers and shareholders are tied under the constraints of many contracts, both of which seem linked together, in essence, their interest objectives are not consistent, there are a lot of conflicts of interest and differences in their pursuit of their own interests. In many aspects, such as asymmetry, inequality, corporate goal setting etc. exist contradictions. The equity incentive, as an effective way to alleviate the conflict between business owners and agents, can exist as a long-term incentives, which encourage managers to concentrate on long-term interests for the future development of enterprises when making related decisions. So it is necessary for us to strengthen further research and analysis on the equity incentive system.Firstly, this study describes the background in details and the main research objectives, the general ideas, the overall structures and possible creative points. On the basis of the introduction of related theories and concepts of stock options incentive, in accord to current status of Chinese listed stock options incentive, analyzes the existing problem among Chinese listed companies, furthermore, through the actual case study on Vanke, analyzes Vanke plan’s main contents and characteristic and implemented results, finally, concludes the constitutional environment faced by Chinese listed companies which implement stock options incentive, and hence improved method, and come up with the shortcomings of this study.