The Empirical Study Of Listed Companies' Stock Options Incentive Effectiveness In China

With the separation of owners and operators in modern enterprise management mode,based on the principal-agent theory,in order to better solve the problem of target inconsistency between owners and managers,which makes the business owners and managers to form an interest community,the stock option incentive system arises at this moment.The stock option incentive theory was produced in the 1950's,and it has been widely and early used in Europe.In the process of the implementation of the listed companies in the western developed countries,the theory has been proven as a huge success.For our country,the stock option motivation research operated later,and in the 1990's,it began to introduce the stock option incentive theory based on the success and failure experience in Europe and the United States and other regions,and then many scholars and entrepreneurs kept exploring a stock options incentive supplication which is suitable for Chinese enterprise management.As the reform of non-tradable shares at the beginning of 2005 in our country and the China securities regulatory commission promulgated the related regulations in 2006,the stock option incentive system widely implement legal environment protection has been initially formed in our country,the stock option incentive system opened a new chapter in the wide implement of the listed companies in our country.So far,on the way to improve the stock option incentive system,stock option system in our country has been run successfully,and to a certain extent,it has been proven as a big success.However,for a bigger success,if thoroughly converting the stock option incentive system to the take-off booster in the new round of economic situation of our country's enterprise,it still needs to do some research and improvement on the problems appearing in the process of implementing stock option incentive.Therefore,this paper,based on the needs to improve the urgency of the stock option incentive system,divided into five chapters.The first expounds the theory foundation of stock option incentive and on this basis there comes a lot of research progress of stock option incentive system through the domestic and foreign scholars.Then,from the implementation of stock option incentive system in the listed companies of China's reality,analyzing our country listed company stock option incentive system of the implementation of the status quo,such as: low proportion of stock option incentive,incentive validity of short,single incentive plan evaluation indexes,implement enterprise especially in non-state enterprises mainly,and making full preparations to test the subsequent effectiveness of the stock option incentive.Secondly,with China's Shanghai and Shenzhen a-share stock option incentive of listed companies as research samples,selecting samples of listed companies from 2010 to 2016 data,with the integrated use of principal component analysis and regression analysis,testing the executives shareholding,the knowledge level of executives and the nature of enterprise and the relationship between the corporate performances,getting the corresponding conclusion.Under the current stock option incentive plan,high degree of executives shareholding and higher degree of employees' knowledge level can more effectively improve the corporate performance of the enterprise,at the same time,for the implementation of stock option incentive plan,it can draw in the equity attribute analysis that the implementation of the non-state enterprises are more widespread,but the non-state enterprise did not achieve more excellent performance than state-owned enterprises.Finally on this basis,to better improve the system of stock option incentive and get more effective implementation of stock option incentive constructive suggestions,which to a certain extent,promoting the stock option incentive achieve even greater success in the application.