A Study On The Impact Of Check-and-Balance Ownership Structure On The Performance Of Listed Companies

To improve the governance structure of listed companies, standardize its operation and keep it stable development, the researchers explored the influence of all aspects of the corporate governance structure of listed. Studies have shown that equity structure as the main part of the governance structure of listed companies, it is reasonable or not directly related to the ability to effectively increase efficiency and improve corporate governance value of listed enterprises, to find the optimal ownership structure has become a focus problem. If ownership structure is too centralized, it will result in a lack of willingness to supervise, the controlling shareholder will be able to occupy the interests of minority shareholders arbitrarily and listed company, reap private benefits of control; if the ownership structure is too scattered, then it will lead to shareholder occupy others interests in the case of asymmetric information and crease the cost of supervision and harm the interests of listed companies. In this context, the theory of check-and-balance ownership has been developed and the company with check-and-balance ownership has several large shareholders who monitor each other and it is very difficult to make quick decisions. Check-and-balance ownership structure can reduce private benefits of control, but at the same time it increases the disagreement costs. Therefore, the relationship between check-and-balance ownership and corporate performance did not reach a unified conclusion. Shareholding structure of checks and balances could effectively resolve conflicts of interest between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders, but at the same time, several major shareholders will bargain in the resolution, and then the bargaining costs will happen. So, both at home and abroad, the study on check-and-balance ownership structure on the performance of listed companies has not formed a consistent conclusion.First of all, the article expounds the background of the research, the purpose, reviewed the literature at home and abroad, introduced the theory of principal-agent theory and property rights theory incomplete contract theory, by choosing1462a-share listed companies from2010to2012, during the4386samples of data, with equity balance degree as the index of equity checks and balances, with main business profitability CROA as evaluation index of corporate performance, with total assets of logarithm, asset-liability ratio, operating income growth rate as control variable, building three regression model in view of the three hypotheses proposed in this paper, using regression analysis conducted empirical research. Through the empirical study, this paper draw the following conclusion:first, the second largest shareholder holding positive correlation with corporate performance; second, equity balance degree show curve relationship with corporate performance, corporate performance began to increase with the increase of equity balance degree, then with the increase of equity balance degree drop; third, the number of checks and balances shareholders positive correlation with corporate performance. Finally, this paper puts forward four suggestions to promote reasonable equity checks and balances structure of listed companies to build and ensure the effective role in the equity checks and balances, the suggestions are as follows:improve the second-largest shareholder’s stake properly, construct a reasonable equity restriction, maintain an appropriate number of external large shareholders, strengthen the relevant securities market system construction policy recommendations...