Research On Equity Check-and-balance Ownership Structure And Non-state-owned Shareholders' Directors And Company Performance

Under the dual driving of policy promotion and survival demand,the development of mixed ownership economy and the introduction of non-state capital have become the direction and goal of state-owned enterprise reform.However,the state-owned enterprises in China's governance structure,there are a lot of problem,for example,the high concentration of equity,insider control and other transitional economies in the ubiquitous problems.The previous scholars come up with the hypothesis directly and the hypothesis is Check-and-Balance Ownership Structure is benefit of the performance of the company,lacking of the relationship between the path of action and the mechanism of the impact of the study.Therefore,this paper introduces the concept of non-state-owned shareholders to appoint directors,mainly to study the non-state shareholders to appoint directors in the Check-and-Balance Ownership Structure and corporate performance between the two play a mediating effect.In this paper,the qualitative induction and analysis are carried out by studying the relevant research results,and then the corresponding mathematical model is constructed by using the multiple regression analysis method in the quantitative analysis method to study the influence path of the Check-and-Balance Ownership Structure on the performance of the state-owned enterprises.Advice on corporate governance issues encountered.This paper takes the listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares as the research samples from 2014 to 2015 and finds that the Check-and-Balance Ownership Structure are conducive to the improvement of corporate performance.The directors of non-state-owned shareholders play a mediating effect between Check-and-Balance Ownership Structure and corporate performance.