Research On The Nature Of Ultimate Controller, Holding Ratio And Technological Innovation Of State-owned Company

Innovation of State-ownedenterprises(SOEs) have been the focus of attentioninacademia.Through unremitting reform and adjustment, China has establishedtheexisting system of state-owned assets supervision and administration. Under thissystem, the management of SOEsare“State owned, graded property”, the actual controlof SOEs rests in the hands of governments or SASAC at all levels. SOEswho aredifferent in the nature of ultimate controller, or different in holding structure, itstechnical innovation behavior will be different. This difference,was concerned by veryfew study in thepast. Empirically, there were mostly from the point of view that thegeneral nature of property rights andSOEs’ innovation issues in the past. Because of thelacked of data, especially the disclosure of listed companies was incomplete, made thestudyabout the nature of the ultimate controller and the corresponding structure ofproperty rights toSOEs’ technological innovation rare.In this paper, we investigatethe impact ofthe nature of SOEs’ ultimate controllerand their holding ratio on the company’s technical innovation behaviortheoretically.Thenwe doaempirical testby using data of listed companies.Firstly, themain contents are described below.Chapter1is an analysis and summarizationof the existing research literature.In Chapter2, the theoretical statements. Analyzes the influencing factors oftechnological innovation, the lacks and the advantages of SOEs’innovation, the wayofhow the nature of SOEs’ ultimate controller and their holding ratio impact thecompany’s technical innovation.And finally, we discuss the methods and necessity ofthe research on the ultimate control.Chapter3isregression analysis based on the theoretical analysis, by the collectiondata about R&D and controller of listed companies.Chapter4summarizes reasons of the empirical resultscombined with theoreticalfoundation. Then, we analyze the practical significance and policy value of theconclusions.Secondly, the paper ’s conclusions and innovations are as follows. In theory, this paper presents the different nature of ultimate controller and thedegree of their control, will produce different effects to technological innovation ofSOEs. And through analysis the way of our state control SOEs,we explain the reasonsfor the differences ofthe effect. In the empirical study, by using the latest data oflistedcompanies’ R&D investment, the nature oftheir ultimate controller and their holdingratio, this paper study the impact between them.The empirical results of this paper show that, the R&D investment of the companycontrolby SASAC proved to be higher, but a large part of this phenomenon may be dueto the national strategic guidance and policy support.Also,there are diminishingmarginal effect between holding ratio andR&D investment. This shows that the stateshould maintain a reasonable and effective degree of control. Companies controlled bythe provincial and municipal SASAC, whose R&D investment is inadequate. But withthe government’s control weakened, the company’s R&D efforts will be strengthened.And this effect is marginal increment. This conclusion is also provide some valuablesupport to further reforms of these type of SOEs.