The Empirical Analysis Of The "Political Tournaments" In County Level

Since the reform and opening up in China, and the government converted theirattention to the economic growth, the competition around the increase of GDP betweenlocal governments in China is been growing drastically. China is a unitary state and itspolitical system is broadly composed of five layers of state administration, with thecentralization on personnel management, which lead that the appointment is partlybased on the performance from the superior. From the reform on market, the center takethe growth seriously, naturally lead to that the appointment of local governments’leaders is mostly based on their economic performance by superiors. In the developingfor the last thirty years, China has achieved rapid economic and social development.This is a very unusual phenomenon. But problems with the great development are moreconcerted by us. Environmental pollution, food security, and the distribution of publicwealth, ect. The high economic growth and the problems are all connected with theappointment of governments’ leaders which is partly based on the economicperformance. As a result, a series of policies on scientific progress attract the public’sattention. The standard of performance on appointment is become diversity, and itshould be.In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the incentive role of personnelcontrol in Zhejiang province from year2003to year2011. In the first part, we presentthe basic theory of championship on the promotion of leaders and relevant empiricalresearch. The second part, we discuss some measures that could produce an effect onturnover of county leaders based on the previous papers. Across to the fact in China andZhejiang province, we draw a conclusion that the standard on leaders has began toconvert to some comprehensive standard, although the growth of GDP has always beenimportant. That is accepted in theory but not in practice. In the third part, we findfiscal expenditure on education, medical insurance, social security and otherexpenditure correlated with the whole level of society, are increasing per year inZhejiang province from year2003to year2011. The growth of the expenditurecorrelated with the living standard is obvious. The forth part, employing the turnoverdata of top county leaders, we find the probability of turnover is not significantlycorrelated with any economic or fiscal measures. But employing the expenditure datacorrelated with the whole level of society, we find the likelihood of promotion of the county leaders increase with the economic performance. That is consistent with theanalysis in the second basically. Last we give some propose on local governance.