Study On Management Shareholding Influence On The Value Of The Company Listen On GEM

In October2009, the GEM(growth enterprise market) was officially launched in Shenzhen Stock Exchange, which is significant progress in the multi-level development of the capital market in China. The companies which listed on the GEM are primarily innovative enterprises with the features of high-technology and high growth. The other important characteristic of the companies which were listed on the GEM is that the company founders or the controlling shareholders are also the managers of company. Therefore, the mean level of managerial ownership incentives about the companies listed on the GEM is relatively high, and investors are more sensitive to management shareholding changes. Abut one year after the GEM launched, many companies lifted the ban and the executives largely reduced holdings the shares in companies, which led to the GEM index sharply dropped. Because of these phenomena, many investors questioned the growth and investment value of GEM. Based on this background, the management ownership of companies listed on the GEM influence on firm value, which will be studied in this paper. Equity incentive is an important mechanism of corporate governance, which is effective incentive mechanism to alleviate the agency conflict between shareholders and managers. Thus to study the effect of management shareholding of company listed on GEM has certain theoretical value and realistic significance.Based on the principal-agent theory, human capital theory and other relevant theory, learning of previous research results, using companies listed on GEM in2009to2012as the research object, through multiple linear regression model and multivariate nonlinear regression model, the linear and nonlinear effects that management shareholding impact on firm value can be empirically tested in this paper. The study result shows that there is no significant linear but interval effect that management shareholding impact on firm value. In particular, using to the return on total assets to evaluate the firm value, management shareholding impact on firm value which demonstrates significant interval effect. Finally, in order to improve the efficiency of the GEM corporate governance, prompt the positive effect of management shareholding, increase the value of the company, policies and suggestion will be issued based on the theoretical analysis and empirical test results of this paper.