| Weak demand in foreign imports, domestic consumption sluggish today, almost all local governments in China suffer from investment mania. Faced with limited capital, local governments have incentives to investors to sell the "olive branch" Investment into fierce competition. Admittedly, local government investment competition to some extent, promote economic growth, but "low land prices,""excessive subsidies" and other acts of vicious competition has also led to a lot of resource depletion and economic losses. Avoid hazards need to "right" to explore the competitive behavior of local government investment logic is particularly important.In this paper,"Zhejiang Investment Return" as a case study. Firstly, sort out competition and government investment research literature, based on a principal-agent theory and the theory of bureaucracy as the starting point, raised pressure on economic performance, target assessment mechanisms, fiscal incentives as a driver competing local government investment motivation research assumptions, Zhejiang province level government as project principal, more vulnerable to economic performance driven by the pressure, city and county government as project agents, more multi-target assessment by higher levels of government mechanisms and fiscal incentives drive. Secondly, we deduce the Zhejiang provincial government goal of the project, proved that the strategies and Zhejiang provincial government pressure on GDP growth correlation. Thirdly, this paper analyzes the city and county government competitive behavior and performance evaluation of leading cadres linked with the goal of accountability, and revenue linked to fiscal incentives policy relevance, and through to Rui’an and Pingyang County’s investment staff issued a questionnaire and AHP proved hypothesis. Finally, in the framework of research findings on how to avoid the causes of local government investment vicious competition, excessive competition suggested. |
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