Based On The Management Of Defense Research Perspective Of Corporate Investment Behavior

As is known to all, the three enterprise financial decision-making is financing decisions, Investment decisions and dividend decisions, as one of three big decisions in enterprise’s finance investment decision, has a pivotal role on the growth of the enterprise development and the efficient allocation of social resources, not only will directly affect the enterprise financing decision, more can have far-reaching influence on corporate dividend policy. In rational capital investment, Enterprise investment behavior only depends on the size of the investment project’s net present value and internal return rate of thgigh and low, sometimes even more motivation level depends on the management of the enterprise manager defense strength.Structure of this paper is dividend into seven chapters. The main content of in front of chapter two is about the paper selected topic background and significance. The research both at home and abroad, this paper adopts the research content and method of defense and management theories and investment theories and related knowledge. Management theory mainly describes management defense hypothesis development course and the difference with the risk of moral hazard, and describes the main investment theories and the latest cutting-edge theories of the efficiency of investment and the efficiency of investment. Investment efficiency theory that describes the MM theory of investment portfolio theory, Capital Asset Pricing Model and so on, at the same time, also introduces the reality accordingly use more investment decision-making evaluation methods, such as Net Present Value and Internal Rate of Return and so on. The efficiency of investment theory provides its definition and related reasons, also gives a measure of efficiency of investment behavior Richardson measurement techniques.The third chapter and the fourth chapter mainly describe the causes of enterprise managers defensive motivation and defensive motivation with management enterprise manager specific manifestation in the investment decision-making process. Reasons include:enterprise manager characteristics; enterprise interior incentive mechanism factors caused by the lack of motivation; enterprise external supervision mechanism factors caused by inadequate by enterprise manager defensive motivation. Manager to manage the specific construction form of defense in investment decisions are:Inadequate investment, Investment myopia, Excessive investment; Ripped off long-term investment in a diversified investment and investment efficiency and form.The fifth chapter mainly through the empirical analysis shows that the content of the enterprise manager defensive motivation level can cause significant material impact to the enterprise investment income. This chapter mainly dividend into three parts:the first proposed to represent the enterprise manager to manage the level of defense nine factors will affect corporate investment income hypothesis; the second is on GUOTAIAN database data from countries after dealing with the SPSS19.0variable correlation and regression straight line carry on the empirical analysis; finally concluded that the management of the enterprise manager defense level does affect the enterprise investment income of the empirical conclusions. Basic conclusions are:(1)the manager’s age is higher, the lower level of management defense, the higher return on investment;(2)the manager degree is higher, the lower level of management defense, the higher return on investment;(3) the manager pay is higher, the lower level of management defense, the greater return on investment;(4)the manager on the job consumption is higher, the lower level of management defense, the higher return on investment;(5)enterprises the proportion of independent directors is higher, the lower level of management defense, the higher return on investment;(6)the manager male gender ratio is higher, the lower level of management defense, the higher return on investment income;(7)the manager’s more part-time units is higher, the higher level of management defense, the lower return on investment.The sixth chapter mainly introduced the defense since the manager management motivation and the inefficient investment behavior of the three reasons put forward the countermeasures, three quantitative models to control the enterprise manager’s defensive motivation management.(1)Training control model tells us in order to curb the management of the enterprise manager defensive motivation, need to strength the enterprise manager’s professional quality training, and with the shareholders of its increasing the cost of education and training, investment income gained by the enterprise shareholder will become smaller and smaller, started training as caused by the training manager management defense level, decrease of corporate managers created by enterprise investment income will be higher, nature of shareholder after training, the rich, the yield will be acquired, however, with the loss of the slowly adapt to the enterprise manager or sensitivity, it can create investment income will decrease.(2)Excitation control model tells us that under the condition of information asymmetry, incentive contract, corporate shareholders of both sides win, therefore, the enterprise manager to continue the pursuit of defense is not a wise choice, unless it pursues the management of the benefits of defense remuneration will be greater than the shareholder to the design of incentive contracts, and the pursuit of managing the risks of defense is acceptable.(3) Supervision and constraint model tells us that in the case of asymmetric information, enterprise managers expected utility maximization is closely related to the shareholders’ supervision mechanism. When shareholders’ supervision not reached PB*namely PB<PB*, the enterprise managers through information asymmetry make some violate compasses operation management defense, in order to make shareholders intensify its supervision, until when the shareholders’supervision to PB:when the shareholders’ supervision is greater than PB*, that is PB> PB*, won’t appear the risk of offending the enterprise managers.The last chapter mainly introduced the research limited and the prospect of research.