Comparison And Revelation Of Executive Incentive In International Listed Company

The separation of two rights in modern enterprises led to the inconsistency of owners and managers, the configuration and coordination of executive incentive contract in different contexts has been the focus in corporate governance. Senior executives as the most important part of human capital, play a decisive role in enterprise. In recent years, the enormous contrast between Corporations’sluggish performance and executives’salary caused widespread concern in the community.This paper use comparative study, theoretical deduction, case study and other methods, drawing comparison of international experience in executive incentive from three aspects. The power allocation of the managers and shareholders in different contexts decide the implementation of executive incentive contract, the compensation characteristics of internal and external trigger executives’motivation, affect executive behavior in regulating of executives’personal characteristics, thereby affecting the company performance. Through the comparison of various countries about the legal system of executive incentive, American information disclosure system, Japan’s new appointment right system, the German double committee system shall be beneficial to China’s Listed Company. By contrast of Sony and Siemens companies can be found, the corporate governance structure from the external environmental impact, influence the power configuration of managers and shareholders, and then determine the executive compensation. Apple, Vodafone’s case shows that executive characteristics regulate motivation impact on executive behavior, and behavior is the mediator variable between executive motivation and the corporate performance.Executives incentive of Listed Company in China can be roughly divided into three modes:high levels of basic salary and company-paid consumption in "welfare" mode,"performance" mode which set up a large annual performance bonus and "incentive mode" which pay attention to long-term incentives. In China, monetary compensation and other short-term incentives accounted for the major part of total compensation, while the stock and option incentive to be absent, the managers’"zero stock" phenomenon is serious. Incentive system based on the perspective of EVA has strong significance in bonus bank and stock option plan. We should increase the strength of equity incentive, and appropriately increase the bonus account for the proportion of executive compensation. In addition, establish the government mechanism for Chinese enterprises of their own characteristics, so that the company’s board of directors, board of supervisors, the compensation committee can operation collaboratively. Pay attention to the control right incentive and reputation incentive, give full play to the supervisory role of the media and the public.