| Large-scale projects are usually funded by the government, which are quite meaningfulfor economic development. However, their comprehensive effect is meanwhile hard toevaluate. During the construction of large-scale projects, due to their big investment, largescale and long periods, cooperators from all sides are highly profitable, thus leading to largeprobability of conspiracy. To investigate how to deal with the conspiracy problems inconstruction of large-scale projects, this paper analyzes the conspiracy problems in follow-up audit mode, and establishes a game model, which provides modelling proof of theperformance of solving the conspiracy problems in follow-up audit mode.This paper first provides some theoretical preliminaries on the possible sorts ofconspiracy in large-scale projects, then explain some basics and concepts involved inconspiracy problems in tracking audio mode, including the definition and judgment oflarge-scaling projects, the meaning of tracking audit, basics on principal-agent theory, rent-seeking, information asymmetric theory and game theory. We analyze the differencesbetween domestic and oversee researches on the reasons, patterns of existence, andprevention of conspiracy in tracking audit mode. We think the utility of tracking audit modehelps to some extend in the prevention of conspiracy, better effect in project management,and the assurance of costs, timeliness and quality of these projects. We further state thenecessity of study on conspiracy problem under follow-up audit mode, the audit basis andrunning mode of these large-scale projects, and then elaborately explain what follow-upaudit does in auditing large-scale projects, in terms of the projects’ starting stage, planningstage, implementation stage and ending stage, respectively.During the construction of large scale projects, we analyze the expectations from allsides, and construct a game model. From the analysis of owners, constructors andsupervisors’ behaviors, we conclude that, based on the information asymmetric theory,principal-agent theory and rent seeking theory, the supervisors of the project loseindependence in traditional final completion audit mode, which make conspiracy morepossible, while in tracking audit mode, due to the supervisors’ inference in advance,supervisors’ independence is guaranteed, which can post out malevolent information to theprojects’ construction in time, thus kill the probability of conspiracy. Base on game theory,we further find that in traditional final completion audit mode, supervisors’ forced choice ofconspiracy is the most vulnerable part of the three parties’ conspiracy, and the supervisors’optimal choice is not to conspire. As a result, three parties’ conspiracy reduces to two parties’ conspiracy, where the increasing minimum renting and the contraction of the totalrenting make conspiracy less possible to happen. Due to its big investment, large scale andlong period, the conspiracy is more likely and follow-up audit is more necessary. Follow-upaudit enhance the supervisors’ status and force in the construction of large scale systems,and change the situation where owners are predominant, thus guarantees independence ofsupervision and audit.Research on follow-up audit Based conspiratory game in large scale projects，provides sufficient guidance to prevent conspiracy in large-scale projects, and is boththeoretically and practically meaningful in improving management effect of large-scaleprojects. |
