Empirical Study Of SME’s Corporate Governance Structure Influence On The Quality Of Information Disclosure

Since the new century has come, following a series of financial frauds at home and abroad. It makes how to enhance the quality of information disclosure of listed firms become the key point in the academic circle and practical field. The quality of information disclosure in listed companies relates to the interests of investors and the stability of the capital market. The governance structure of corporation is an important endogenous factor affecting the quality of information disclosure. Perfect governance structure is beneficial to reduce the information asymmetry and the entrusted agency conflicts, so as to improve the quality of information disclosure. Since2004, As of December31,2013, SME have been701listed companies of SME board. SME board markets played a vital role in stability of capital marke. Relative to the motherboard, the company of SME board has a better growth, which is also more risky. It puts more emphasizes on the timeliness, etc. As a result, it has important practical significance to explore how to improve the quality of information disclosure in the listed company of SME board from the perspective of corporate governance.This thesis is based on the principal-agent theory, stakeholder theory, informationasymmetry theory and efficient market theory, which from the ownership structure, boardfeatures, and executive incentive characters to build eight measures to judge the companygovernance structure. It collects the data of governance structure in listed companies in SMEboard from2009to2012, combining with the information rating results of Shenzhen stockexchange website, to analyze the present situation of information disclosure quality in listedcompanies in the SME board. The thesis also constructs the Logistic regression model toinspect governance structure influence of listed company in the SME board on the quality ofinformation disclosure.The results show that the share ratio of the largest shareholder and senior executivesalary has the positive significant on the quality of information disclosure. What’s more, CEOduality, management ownership, the proportion of independent directors, equity restrictionration is not able to give obviously significance to the quality of information disclosure.However, the board scale and number give the negative significant to the quality ofinformation disclosure. It is clear that the governance structure of listed companies in SMEboard exit many problems. Such as, first, the management and the board do not separate substantially. Second, the independent director, in the sense of, is not really independence.Third, the second largest shareholder’s ratio is too low to influence the decisions made by thelargest shareholder, thus forming the situation of the largest shareholder’s checks and balances.Four, the board’s work efficiency is low. Finally with the combination of the physical truth oflisted company of SME board, the thesis puts forward optimizing the structure from the sideof the ownership structure, improving the supervision function from the side of the board,perfecting the system of rewards and penalties from the side of the administration, enhancingthe quality to standardize the governing structure of the company from the side of exterioraudit, and heightening the quality of information disclosure.