Mechanism Research On Buyback Contract Of Perishable Product Supply Chain

With the rapid development of economy, differentiation，personalization and uncertaintyof people’s needs are being highlighted quickly. Technology continues to improve, the rapidpace of product updates, product life cycles continue to shorten. In this situation, perishablegoods emerged and developed rapidly. Economic integration and globalization increasecompetition among enterprises, competition among enterprises gradually converts into thecompetition between supply chains. Coordination of supply chain can enable the enterprisesto achieve the best benefits and enhance cohesion between enterprises, so as to achieve awin-win or multi-win situation. For perishable goods industry, due to the characteristics,supply chain management is particularly important. Based on above, this paper studies theperishable product’s supply chain, begin to analyze the problem of supply chain coordinationfrom the perspective of buyback contract.(1) Analyzing the game problems between retailers and suppliers on the wholesale price.First，second-price bid is introduced, trading patterns is analyzed. On the basis of thebargaining ability of retailers and suppliers, using second-price bid and Static Games ofIncomplete Information to provide the wholesale price to each transaction mode. Then，through establishing the revenue model under the cooperative policy and the non-cooperativepolicy. To analyze flexibility gain of supply chain, according to the contributions proportionof increased profits, the bargaining ability of the parties was determined. Finally, therelationship between bargaining and other contract parameters are analyzed.(2) Discussing the situation of goods is sold at reduction price during the period of salesusing coordination theory. First, the revenue model is established under the cooperative policy,the optimal decision variables of supply chain is discussed. Second, the revenue model undergoods is sold at regular price is established under the cooperative policy, and the optimaldecision variables is given. The reason that goods is sold at reduction price is given throughthe comparative analysis of the optimal decision variables relationship in both cases. Finally,the revenue model under goods is sold at reduction price is established under thenon-cooperative policy. The conditions of supply chain coordination at current are given byanalyzed with the model of goods sold not at regular price(3) Discussing the problem of supply chain coordination when the retailers promote salesusing the theory of coordination. First, the revenue model is established under the cooperativepolicy, the optimal decision variables is discussed. Second, the revenue model is establishedunder the non-cooperative policy and the non-buyback contract policy, And the optimaldecision variables is discussed. The reason that the supply chain can’t be coordinated is given by analyzing the optimal decision variables under the cooperative policy. Third, the revenuemodel is established under the cooperative policy and the buyback contract policy, optimaldecision variables is discussed. The reason that the supply chain can’t be coordinated is givenby analyzing the optimal decision variables under the cooperative policy. Fourth, the revenuemodel is established under the cooperative policy, the Buyback contract policy and thecost-sharing policy. The conditions of supply chain coordination are given by analyzing themodel of the cooperative policy. Finally, the situation that the demand of market is influencedby sale promotion is considered.(4) The promotional efforts buyback contract model is used in supply chain coordinationof fast food, in order to verify the feasibility and effectiveness of the model.