Study On The Allocation Of Residual Control Rights Of PPP Projects Under The View Of Self-interest

In recent years, the franchise business model is gradually introduced into thefield of infrastructure in many areas of our country. Among the many franchise mode,PPP (Public-Private-Partnership) model for its ease pressure on government finances,promotion of investment diversification, public and private sectors from each other, areasonable allocation of risk and other advantages become mainstream, which iswidely used in urban water supply hot water and other types of municipal utilities aswell as roads, railways, airports and hospitals. PPP which makes the public sector andprivate sector investors in a cooperative mode, and its essence is to dig the publicsectors’ and the private sectors’ strengths fully, and it can better serve the publicprovision of public goods or services better. However, current researches haveconcentrated on conceptual understanding of analysis, the need for partnerships andpractical qualitative analysis and risk management and quantitative analysis ofrisk-sharing mechanisms, there have been the limitations of research perspective,content and methods. At the main time, they all ignored the contractual Nature of PPPmode.Based on incomplete contract and relational contract, this paper has studied thatthe allocation of residual rights of control is the main factor of cooperation efficiencybetween government and non-government. Based on this, this paper focuses on thestudy of the allocation of residual rights of control issues. In the life cycle of oneproject, the partners decide the investment level of the project before the investment,which directly affects the efficiency of cooperation efficiency. In this paper, I havedivided the investment into two types-communal investment and self-interestinvestment both in government and non-government. And I have studied four sectionsabout this issue-only communal investment, only government has self-interestinvestment, only non-government has self-investment, and both have self-investment.This model has studied the relation between the proportion of residual rights ofcontrol and the optimal level of investment.Based on the above issues, this paper hasproposed measures to improve cooperation efficiency--develop distribution planwhich is complete and operational as much as possible; develop supply policies whichcarry out the operation between government and non-government; clarify the borderof responsibility between government and non-government in PPP projects; improve astandard of public-private partnerships in government regulatory norms and specifythe market environment where public-private partnerships modes are used to provide public goods or services.