Research Of Relativity Between Top Executive Excess Compensation And Performance Of Listed Company In China

The phenomenon that executives of listed companies at home and abroad with high compensation is questioned on the reasonableness of executive compensation by people, which makes executive’s excess compensation a hot research issue in corporate governance. At present, overseas research mainly focuses on the causes of executive’s excess compensation and relevance over executive’s excess compensation and company performance. Domestic research mainly focuses on the causes of excessive executive’s compensation in the background of China, and the correlation over executive’s excess compensation and corporate performance is less mentioned. The special institutional background of China enables the research on causes of executive’s excess compensation and relevance over executive’s payment and company performance to have a very important practical significance on the improvement of China’s public companies executive compensation incentive system, and of the effectiveness of its executive compensation contracts and corporate performance as well as the reformation of state-owned enterprises.Based on the large number of collected literature, taking corporate governance as the theoretical basis, this thesis takes a systematic study of executive’s excess compensation of China’s listed companies. First, based on the definition of executive power and executive’s excess compensation, different perspectives about executive’s excess compensation such as the agent theory, optimal contract theory, manager’s power theory is discussed in this thesis. Second, taking China’s A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2013 as samples, take empirical analysis on Chinese listed company’s executive’s excess compensation contributing factors with the multiple regression model. The results show that: there is a significant positive correlation among the managerial power, market performance, size, financial leverage, and executive’s excess compensation. Finally, taking 1379 A-shares of listed companies in 2013 as samples, using state-owned and private listed companies regression data to analyze the relationship between executive’s excess compensation and corporate performance. The empirical results show that: the excess executive compensation of state-owned listed companies can significantly improve market performance, but not obvious in private listed companies.This features and innovations of this thesis are as follows: ① analyzing the situations and possible reasons of Chinese executive’s excess compensation from the theoretical perspective of agent theory, optimal contract theory, and manager power theory; ② establishing multiple regression model to take the empirical analysis of Chinese listed company’s managerial power and executive’s excess compensation; ③ analyzing the relationship between executive’s excess compensation and company performance from the perspective of financial performance and market performance.