An Empirical Research On Excess Executive Compensation Of A-share Listed Companies

Executive compensation is always the focus of social consensus and academia.The gap between executive compensation and average salary of ordinary staff is annually the headline of the press.In 2009,Chinese six departments jointly released Further Guidance on Regulating the Compensation of the Management in Central State-Owned Enterprises.In 2014,State-owned Assets Supervision& Administration Commission released Reform Approach on the Compensation of the Management in State-Owned Enterprises.The documents were aimed to restrain excess executive compensation and narrow the gap between executive compensation and average salary of ordinary staff.Therefore,researching on executive compensation and exploring the correlation between the executive compensation and company performance turn out to be important,which cannot only solve the unequally distributions but also build an effective incentive system.This thesis builds three models based on Effective Contract Theory and Management Power Theory: model one the influence factors on executive compensation model,model two computation of executive compensation model,model three the correlation between excess compensation and future company performance.Based on the agency theory of company governance,this thesis selects economic variables,board structure variables and ownership structure variables,totally 16 variables for regression.This thesis selects the samples of A-share limited companies and state-owned A-share listed enterprises between 2012 and 2014.The empirical results show that A-share listed companies and all state-owned enterprises are on the stage of management power theory.Classified by administrative ranks,this thesis testifies that local state-owned enterprises are on the stage of management power theory,while central state-owned enterprises are probably on the stage of effective contract theory.