Analysis Of Eva Performance Evaluation On State-Owned Key Enterprises’ Over-Investment Influence Degree

Investing activities are the core of enterprise management, and Investing activities are focusing on the principle of maximizing their companies’ benefits. According to the statistics in China, the fixed assets investment retains a relatively small portion of the total investment, and this characteristic influences our country’s investment decisions; in addition, it is a main factor to affect China’s economy development. Moreover, government-owned companies are the main contributor of the fixed assets investment, and this investment maintains a large scale and grows rapidly. Therefore, the investment efficiency of government-owned companies determines the overall investment efficiency in our country plays. Furthermore, because the central government-owned enterprises are leaders in key industries, their investment activities receive attention from scholars and the public, and the investment efficiency is a hot issue to study.Because of our special system, the principal-agent problem becomes significant overtime, and owner’s negligence and internal control weakness may cause the managers to pursue their own interests and blindly enlarge the production scale without considering the cost and investment efficiency of a company. Thus, the principal-agent problem not only lowers the investment efficient of a company but harms the company as a whole. Also, China’s government-owned company has some other problems in reforming. First, the management skills need to be improved along with the expansion of government-owned enterprises. Second, the resource allocation problem should be solved, and the company should focus on their core competencies.Based on the above situation, in order to solve the investment efficiency problem and regulate the investment activities of the central government-owned enterprises, state-owned assets supervision and administration commission of the state council was formally implemented the economic value added (EVA).Central enterprise in our country nowadays, implementation of the interim regulations, head of the central enterprise operating performance evaluation has been more than four years, based on this background, this paper selected from 2007 to 2013 as sample interval, selecting Shanghai and shenzhen stock market during this period all a-share listed companies as the sample data, first using Richardson (2006) the expected investment model assessment excessive investment level, then select one of the samples of excessive investment behavior state, used to verify the implementation of economic value added (EVA) on the excessive investment effect, the article adopts the method of the combination of theoretical and empirical, to examine EVA performance evaluation before, during and after the implementation of its impact on the central holdings of investment behavior of listed companies of our country. Conclusion shows that the state really have the phenomenon of excessive investment, economic value added evaluation indexes for the excessive investment behavior can have obvious inhibition effect.