The Adverse Selection’s Existence Test And Weakening Model In Commercial Health Insurance Market

In China, the current circumstances of commercial health insurance cannot meet the the growing demand of health care service. "High compensation level, low income ratio" has become a significant problem of commercial health insurance. And the study of adverse selection in health insurance market is the key in solving this problem. As is known, the existence of adverse selection would affect the balance of supply and demand, resulting in decreased efficiency of the insurance market, and severely hinder the healthy development of insurance market. This paper is organized with six chapters, in which a theoretical model that examines the existence of adverse selection in Chinese commercial health insurance is established, followed by models to weaken adverse selection effect and measures to prevent adverse selection.The first part summarizes research background and its significance, introduces results at home and abroad, research methods, main content and innovation points of this paper, and questions if there exists adverse selection in health insurance market.The second part introduced the meaning of adverse selection, analyzed its causes, and elaborated its influence on insurance companies, the insured and insurance industry.The third chapter optimizes the thought of classical standard asymmetry information model, establishes a utility model to explain the test bias which may be caused by hetero-geneity. Considering the above test bias,The theoretical models were established, which includes regression model test, conditional correlation test and non-parametric test, to determine the existence of adverse selection. Also, according to 2011 Sichuan province’s actual survey data of health insurance willing, descriptive statistics has been made to analyse differentiation between groups with different premiums in the forth chapter.In fifth chapter,empirical tests have been conducted to determine the existence of adverse selection.After the existence of adverse selection is confirmed,in the sixth chapter,screening model and signaling model are established which can weaken mechanism of adverse selec-tion theoretically. Signal screening model finds that it can be effective to identify the risk of insured by use of designing diversified policies with different premiums and coinsurance rates.With the idea of signaling model, we find that after the introduction of punish-ment and joint signal which inducing the insured tell the truth,there exists a separating equilibrium. On the basis of above two models,several reasonable suggestions are made. At last,there is a summary about the whole article.