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Separate Test Of Adverse Selection And Moral Hazard

Posted on:2021-04-22Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X J YinFull Text:PDF
GTID:2439330611992788Subject:Finance
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years,with the aggravation of aging population and the improvement of people’s living standards,people pay more attention to their health.The demand for health insurance is increasing,and the development potential of the health insurance market is huge.However,with the rapid growth of the underwriting business of China’s commercial health insurance companies,the compensation expenses of health insurance companies are also increasing,and their operating conditions are not optimistic.One of the important reasons for this phenomenon is the adverse selection and moral hazard of policy-holders.As people’s demand for insurance increases,the probability of adverse selection and moral hazard also increases.Therefore,this paper takes commercial medical insurance as an example and empirically verifies the existence of adverse selection and moral hazard in China’s commercial medical insurance market from the perspective of separation test of adverse selection and moral hazard,so as to deeply explore the deep reasons for the common losses of commercial health insurance companies.First,based on the dynamic data of “China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study” in 2013 and 2015,this paper uses the Probit model to separate the adverse selection and moral hazard of China’s commercial medical insurance market,and uses the Heckprobit,Bivariate Probit and IV Probit models to conduct robustness test.Finally,on this basis,analyze the impact of consumer heterogeneity on positive selection and moral hazard from the aspects of consumer gender,age,urban and rural,income and education.The study finds that there are both positive selection and moral hazard in China’s commercial medical insurance market,that is,the group with better physical health status is more inclined to buy commercial medical insurance,but the group that buys commercial medical insurance has a higher utilization rate of medical services.Therefore,the main reason for the loss of commercial health insurance companies is m oral hazard.At the same time,age and smoking are significantly negatively correlated with purchase of commercial medical insurance,and the insurance purchase is concentrated in high-income,highly educated people and urban residents.The phenomenon of positive selection is more obvious among the group with 35-50 age,urban residents and low-income.The phenomenon of moral hazard is more obvious in the group with higher education,women and rural residents.Therefore,health insurance companies should pay attention to avoid the risk of moral hazard.They can build information exchange and cooperation platform to eliminate information asymmetry,and improve the mechanism of supervision and inspection,improve the internal management of insurance companies,strengthen risk prevention and control in rural areas,increase the personal out-of-pocket ratio,reduce the loss of compensation.In addition,we should make full use of positive selection and tap potential consumer groups to improve the profitability of health insurance companies.
Keywords/Search Tags:Commercial medical insurance, Adverse selection, Moral hazard, Probit model
PDF Full Text Request
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