The Theory Of Board System Of State-owned Company

The current state-owned enterprise reform has entered a deep phase, which focuses on advancing the modern enterprise system of state-owned enterprises through the improvement of corporate governance. The object of the research is the wholly state-owned company under the pilot work of the board of directors. The wholly state-owned company is the product of the reform of state-owned enterprises in our country, Because of its unique property rights, it has a great difference with respect to a limited liability company, which belongs to the traditional civil law. So for the management of a wholly state-owned company cannot treat as the same. Throughout the state-owned corporate governance models, the construction of the board are regarded as the core, which is the key to the reform theory. In recent years, China’s state-owned construction company board has made tremendous progress, this article is reflecting defects and shortcomings in the process of system learning and building on the basis of drawing lessons from foreign owned company operation, and exploring effective ways for the legal system of the Board of Directors of state-owned company with Chinese characteristics.This paper is divided into the following sections, the first chapter introduces the theory of the origin and the board of directors, include the definition and characteristics of China’s state-owned companies, as well as our country background and evolution of a wholly state-owned company and carried out detailed analysis for the contents of the Board of Directors since 2005 system of experimental work state-owned Board of Directors. The second chapter is the reference of the United States, Germany and Singapore’s state-owned corporate governance related experience, summed up the method of the board of directors of a wholly state-owned company system in China. The third chapter pointed out the problems of the current board of directors of the wholly state-owned company currently existing problems, and gives a deep analysis of the causes. Chapter four concludes that we must promote the institution building of the Board under the guidance of the principles of the market economy, and gives detailed proposals of system construction for improving China’s state-owned company’s board of directors.