Relationship Research Between Perquisite Consumption And Earnings Management In Stated-owned Listed Companies

In recent years, the phenomenon that the executives of China’s state-owned listed company use their authority of office to seek excessive perquisite consumption caused widespread concern in our society, the opportunistic behavior that managers abuse their privileges for personal gain has been denounced constantly. At the same time, a series of regulations to restrict perquisite consumption has been repeatedly issued, which show that the urgency of solving excessive perquisite consumption problems and the determination to regularize perquisite consumption behavior. To satisfy private benefits and to access to external resources are two basic purposes of perquisite consumption. Chinese scholars have basically reached a consensus that excessive perquisite consumption in state-owned enterprises has a negative impact on business performance. So in order to cover up the bad performance or sheltered by external resources, whether state-owned enterprise executives will choose to do the earnings management? Considering the difference on the quality of information disclosure may lead to the differences in the game relations between the shareholders, regulators and investors. Whether the degree of earnings management affected by the change of state-owned enterprise’s perquisite consumption as information disclosure quality changes? The answers to these questions will help to reduce the moral hazard of state-owned enterprise executives, improve corporate governance efficiency and improve earnings quality, which have important theoretical and practical significance.Based on this, this paper studies the relationship between perquisite consumption and earnings management, the relationship between information disclosure quality and earnings management. What’s more, how the quality of information disclosure effect on the degree of earnings management caused by perquisite consumption is also analyzed. Through the contract theory, incentive theory and domestic and foreign literature, this paper deduced the routes, which becomes groundwork for the proposed research hypotheses.This article selects 985 observation samples in the year from 2009 to 2013 for the empirical analysis. All the observation samples are state-owned listed companies in Shenzhen Stock Exchange. This paper draws the following conclusions:(1) The amount of perquisite consumption in our state-owned listed companies is huge presented in detail, while rare companies presented in detail. (2) Excessive perquisite consumption will prompt earnings management, prompting positive earnings management to a greater extent than negative. (3) With the improvement of information disclosure quality, state-owned companies will reduce the degree of earnings management, especially in the negative earnings management aspect, but positive earnings management is a lack of binding. (4) In the case of other conditions remain unchanged; with the improvement of information disclosure quality, the degree of earnings management caused by excessive perquisite consumption can be alleviated, especially in the negative earnings management aspect. Finally, according to research findings, policy recommendations are proposed from the dual perspective to optimize corporate governance.