Research On The Effect Of Direcors Of Non-controling Sheareholders On Perquisite Consumption

Perquisite consumption refers to the monetary consumption incurred by the company's top management in the process of exercising its powers and performing its duties,and other consumption behaviors derived therefrom.Compared with Western companies,the listed companies in China have frequent on-the-job consumption phenomena.This kind of behavior will not only cause serious waste of enterprise resources,but also significantly increase agency costs,and will also significantly reduce the efficiency of corporate governance.Based on this,it is one of the problems that enterprises need to solve urgently by which corporate governance mechanism effectively suppresses excessive excessive consumption behavior of management.As an important part of the company's internal governance mechanism,the board of directors can often play a key role in corporate governance.As a result,the board of directors is often seen as an effective internal governance mechanism that can reasonably resolve the issue of principal-agent between shareholders and management.Therefore,the effectiveness of board governance will directly affect the survival and development of enterprises.The board of directors of a listed company is generally divided into internal directors and external directors.Different types of directors play different roles in supervision and governance.Existing research generally believes that due to the direct involvement of internal directors in the company's business activities,there is a possibility that the top management of the company will generate interest transfer behavior,and thus it will not be able to play an effective supervisory role.The external directors do not serve in the company,and their independence is much higher than that of the internal directors.It can also more effectively supervise the company's business activities and the behavior of senior managers.In terms of the effectiveness of external directors' governance,existing researchers focus on the governance effects of independent directors.However,with the deepening of research,the directors of non-controlling shareholders have gradually received the attention of researchers due to their unique identity and governance effects.A director of a non-controlling shareholder refers to a director who is employed in a shareholder unit(other than the largest shareholder unit of the listed company)and is also a member of the board of directors of the listed company.Specifically,non-controlling shareholders hold company equity,so they will be more concerned about the business performance of the company.In most cases,non-controlling shareholders will choose to directly participate in the company's operation and management in order to protect their own interests.Non-controlling shareholders realize the governance and supervision of the companies they invest in by means of the placement of directors in the board of directors is one of the main ways to realize the interests of non-controlling shareholders.If a non-controlling shareholder is stationed on the board of directors,on the one hand,he can better understand the relevant information of the company's operation and management,and supervise the behavior of senior managers;on the other hand,the directors representing the interests of non-controlling shareholders can fully convey the board of directors.And exchange the interests of non-controlling shareholders,and play a role in improving the efficiency of corporate governance.Therefore,from the perspective of the effectiveness of non-controlling shareholders' directors,this paper focuses on the impact of non-controlling shareholders on the on-the-job consumption of executives.At the same time,from the internal governance of the company and the external supervision of the company,it is studied whether the property rights,equity checks and balances and marketization process can play a regulatory role in the relationship between non-controlling shareholders and senior executives.On the basis of reviewing related literatures,this paper analyzes the relationship between non-controlling shareholders'directors and on-the-job consumption based on principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory and property rights theory,and puts forward the nature of property rights,equity checks and balances,and The impact mechanism of the marketization process.In the empirical test section,this paper selects the relevant data of Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2013 to 2017 as the research sample,and uses statistical analysis software to descriptive statistical analysis,Pearson correlation analysis and multiple regression analysis of relevant variables to verify the non-control The influence of shareholder directors on the on-the-job consumption of executives,and further study the role of property rights,equity checks and balances,and marketization processes in the relationship between the two.Through empirical tests,it is found that the directors of non-controlling shareholders can significantly inhibit the on-the-job consumption behavior of executives.The higher the proportion of non-controlling shareholders,the stronger the restraining effect.In addition,the paper also concludes that the role of non-controlling shareholder directors in different property rights enterprises is different.Compared with state-owned enterprises,non-controlling shareholder directors play a more supervisory role in non-state-owned enterprises;Different levels of equity checks and balances will also have a regulatory effect on the relationship between non-controlling shareholders and senior executives.In the case of high equity checks and balances,the non-controlling shareholder's restraining effect on executives'incumbent consumption is compared to equity.At the same time,the degree of balance is even more significant.At the same time,it is also found that in areas with a high degree of marketization,the directors of non-controlling shareholders can exert a stronger restraining effect on the on-the-job consumption of executives.According to the research conclusions,this paper proposes corresponding policy recommendations:(1)Construct a reasonable board structure.A reasonable board structure can not only supervise the role of management,but also effectively promote the efficiency of corporate governance and reduce the cost of agency.(2)Enhance.the discourse power of non-controlling shareholders.Enterprises should fully recognize the important role played by the directors of non-controlling shareholders in the board of directors,strive to improve the relevant director selection policy,and support non-controlling shareholder representatives to enter the board of directors to enhance the proportion and voice of directors of non-controlling shareholders in the board of directors,and Make it better to play a supervisory role.(3)Reduce administrative intervention for state-owned enterprises.The government should appropriately reduce administrative interventions for state-owned enterprises and give them more autonomy.(4)Strengthen the constraints on the rights of major shareholders.Enterprises should appropriately strengthen the restrictions on the rights of major shareholders,so that more non-controlling shareholders have the right to speak,so that they can participate more effectively in corporate governance activities.(5)Strengthen external supervision and effectiveness.Enterprises should actively seek external supervision.While internal supervision is effective,external supervision can be combined with internal supervision to exert synergy and further strengthen the governance and supervision effect on enterprises.