A Comparative Study On Increasing Stockholdings By Insiders In The Listed Companies In China

The accomplishment of stock split reform makes the A share market in China entered into the entire circulation times. Under this background, the increasing or decreasing shareholding behavior by insiders in listed companies is also increasing, which has attracted increasing attention. The current literature focus on the study of decreasing shareholding behavior by insiders, while there is little study in increasing shareholding, and there is no comparative study of increasing shareholding by executives and major stock holders which are two kinds of important insiders. But this kind of study has theoretical and practical significance to the management of capital market and the investment strategy selection of investors. This thesis intends to conduct the research on this aspect.This thesis selects listed companies which has 403 major stock holders and 181 executives, both of them have the increasing shareholding behavior during 27th, August 2008 to 30th December 2012 as the study object, by the way of combination of theoretical research and empirical research, deeply studied the characteristics of increasing shareholding behavior of insiders, marker effect and using of information superiority. Firstly, this thesis analyzes and compares the characteristics of increasing shareholding time, industry, company scale, the ratio of increasing shareholding, controlling shareholders and shareholders of increasing shareholding of the executives and major stock holders. Then with the event study method, make comparative study of the short and long term market effect of increasing shareholding by executives and major stock holders, and the short and long term increasing shareholding effect by the classify of increasing shareholding ratio, nature of increasing shareholding enterprise, meanwhile, explain the increasing shareholding behavior of insiders by signaling transmission effect and tunnel effect. Build the model to comparative the information superiority on performance forecast and valuation judgment of executives and major stock holders. In the end, according to the research conclusions, this thesis proposed reference enlightenment on theory, strategy and policy.Study shows that, there is signaling transmission effect and tunnel effect of shareholding behavior by insiders in listed companies; there is difference in the market effect of executives and major stock holders; the long and short term market effect of executives increasing shareholding is relatively obvious; while there is only obvious long term market effect in major stock holders. With different increasing shareholding ratio and enterprise nature, the market effect of insiders increasing shareholding is different. As the using of information superiority, major stock holders is larger than executives, and major stock holders with high increasing shareholding can make great use of information superiority.