| Family business,as a kind of special enterprise form, is not only a simple family and enterprise integration. As an old and common form, family business is always controversial. Although many scholars believe that family rules management is not adapt to modern enterprise any longer. There is no doubt between developed European and American countries and developing Asia countries, family enterprise is an important part of a country’s GDP through the age.According to the survey of Kelin E. Gersick and others, more than 80% of global firms are family businesses. Even the world 500 strong, family enterprise proportion is as high as 40%.In America, the family enterprise not only created over 50% of the gross national product, but also employ more than half of the workforce across the United States; In Europe, even most of the big companies are controlled by the individual or family. Chinese family businesses develop rapidly after the reform and open policy and become an integral part of the non-public sectors of the economy in our country. In order to better adapt to the economic situation and improve the competitiveness of their own, many family businesses improve the enterprise internal management system in the capital market. Among them, choosing the CEO has a great effect on the development of a family business.In general, family businesses have two options when they choose the CEO: some choose family members as a CEO, while others choose professional managers as a CEO. In this paper, we found that whether the CEO comes from family will make different effects on the company’s performance, it can influence the family business of inter generational inheritance issues indirectly. Different types of CEO will cause different problems of agency: when CEO comes from the family, the owner will use "The Stewardship Theory" to sign a implicit contract because ownership and management rights division does not occur. In this case, if family control of the controlling shareholder and cash flow rights separation, the family could use their right to violate the interests of minority shareholders; When CEO comes from outside the family, ownership and management rights are no longer unify, it will produce the principal-agent problem between the owner and operator, the owner will use "CEO Pay Incentive Theory" to sign a dominant contract. However, because of "altruism" and "rational man hypothesis" point of view, the company performance will be higher when CEO comes from family.The first part of the article mainly introduces the research background, purpose and meaning. The second part is literature review at home and abroad, mainly introducing the family business corporate performance study of relevant literature. The third part describes the related theory: Transaction Cost Theory, Principal-Agent Theory, Stewardship Theory and the Theory of CEO Pay and put forward relevant assumptions. The fourth part is the research design. We set up the econometric model, and define the model of the related variables on the basis of the article hypothesis, and predecessors’ research. The fifth part is the empirical part.The article selected the relevant data from 2011 to 2013 of Chinese A-share non-financial listed family companies. Family business is divided into two categories on the basis of CEO’s source : CEO within the family business and CEO outside of family business. Research shows that the corporate performance which CEO comes from the family business is still higher than CEO is not from family business. The sixth part is the conclusion.According to the research conclusion,we put forward the corresponding policies,suggestions and provides the possible directions for future research... |
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