The Research On The Impact Of Debt Maturity Structure On Investment Efficiency Of Listed Companies From The Perspective Of Property Right

Debt financing and investment, as the two basic financial business activities of corporation, are closely linked. Existing research results show that the debt financing will cause shareholders and managers encroach on creditors’ benefits. They choose some asset substitution or under-investment behaviors. At the same time, debt could reduce the over-investment behavior arising from the conflict between shareholders and managers. Managers would like to build scale in order to seek more benefits. However, liabilities especially current liabilities can cut the free cash flow, and then reduce managers’ over-investment behavior. It is called contingent governance of debt. Generally speaking, liabilities can not only decrease investment efficiency, but also increase investment efficiency. Therefore, it is necessary to do some further research on debt financing. Debt maturity structure is studied in this paper. Agency costs and governance functions of different debt maturity structure are also different. In order to make the results more suitable for the enterprises in our country, different nature of the ultimate controlling shareholder is considered in this paper.This paper selects Chinese A-share listed companies of manufacturing industry from 2010 to 2012 for the study samples. Drawing on Richardson Model, we calculate the indicator of the non-efficiency investment behavior, and divide it into over-investment and under-investment indicator. Then we use the indicator to research the impact of current liability and long-term liability on non-efficiency investment behavior. Furthermore, the sample is divided into non-state-owned listed companies and state-owned listed companies, including the companies controlled by central government and local government. Then the impact of debt maturity structure on non-efficient investment behavior is researched from the perspective of property right.Empirical results show that over-investment behavior is more common in state-owned companies, and under-investment behavior is more common in non-state-owned companies. For the over-investment behavior, in the whole samples, the current liability can restrict it, especially in the non-state-owned companies, but the governance is the weakest in state-owned companies controlled by local government. The correlation between long-term liability and investment efficiency is not significant. For the under-investment behavior, compared by current liability, the long-term liability can relief the under-investment behavior. To ensure the stability of the empirical results, a robustness test is made. At last, some suggestions are given to increase investment efficiency of listed companies.