The Empirical Study On The Controlling Shareholder’s Governance Behavior Of State-owned Listed Companies And Corporate Performance

At present, the state-owned holding companies exist in various forms in our country economic system. To study the governance of state-owned holding companies and ensure the effective exercise of state-owned shares is the important process of improving operating efficiency and preventing the loss of state-owned assets, which has important theoretical and practical significance for SOE reform and the improvement of the state-owned assets supervision and management system. The more prominent issue in state-owned corporate governance is that in general, as their actual controller, the SASAC or government can use indirect holding or indirect holding mode to influence the strategies and management of company by the meeting of stockholders and the chairman of board or senior executive of state-owned enterprises is also nominated or sent by the government. In addition, the state-owned companies shoulder the dual goals of economic and social. So there would bring the game of business goal and political aim in the company decision making. And the realization of political goals can promote that the government intervene the company decision making and the resource allocation and then influence the corporate performance. This paper used the state-owned listed companies from 2007 to 2013 as the sample to analyze the validity of the controlling shareholder governance structure and the governance behavior and to study the optimization problem of the controlling shareholder governance structure and the governance behavior.This paper followed the main line “structure-behavior-performance”. And according the different governance behavior under the different governance structure, this paper firstly studied the the validity of the controlling shareholder governance structure in different industry competition environment, and then discussed the relationship of controlling shareholder’s governance behavior and the corporate performance in different governance structure and competition environment. At last, this paper put forward optimization countermeasures of the governance structure and governance behavior under different competition environment through summing up the conclusion of empirical research.The first chapter mainly introduced the background and significance of the research and the technology roadmap. The second chapter defined the industry competition environmentand controlling shareholder’s governance behavior, and made literature review on the controlling shareholder’s governance behavior and the corporate performance with the theoretical support of double principle-agent theory and competition theory. The third chapter used the state-owned listed companies from 2007 to 2013 as the sample, made descriptive statistics about the controlling shareholder’s governance behavior of state-owned listed companies in different industry competition environment based on the perspective of different control structure, different controlling shareholders types and different industry. The fourth chapter analyzed the validity of the controlling shareholder governance structure. The control structure of the controlling shareholder is a key factor affecting their behavior. Then the different industry competition environment and different control structure will lead to different behavior efficiency. Therefore, the governance structure of this chapter is represented by the control structure, and the governance efficiency is represented by the corporate value. And then this chapter analyzed the effective matching between the industry competition environment and governance structure to determine the boundary of the analysis of the controlling shareholder’s governance behavior. The fifth chapter studied the impact of the controlling shareholder’s governance behavior on corporate performance, and discussed what impact of the controlling shareholder’s governance behavior produced by the different governance structure has been on the corporate performance, which combined the variables of controlling shareholder control properties, for the control of the board of directors and supervisors, the incentives for executives. And this chapter provide theoretical basis for the sixth chapter. Finally, the sixth chapter put forward relevant suggestions through summing up the conclusion of empirical research. The conclusions are as follows:1. Every industry has different competition environment. Under the high competition environment, decentralized shareholding is more conducive to the performance of state-owned listed companies, but under the low competition environment, relative shareholding is more conducive to the performance. No matter how the environment, the deviation of the control rights and cash flow rights are not conducive to improve the performance, especially the companies of majority shareholding.2. From the point of controlling shareholders on the control of the board of directors, the function of the independent director is more effective under the high competition environment,especially the companies of relative shareholding. Under the low competition environment,especially the companies of relative shareholding, chairman of the board serve as general manager is not conducive to improve the performance. While the variable of sending the chairman has a significantly negative relationship with corporate performance under the high competition environment, especially the companies of decentralized shareholding. And the variable of sending the general manager is significantly positively related with corporate performance under the low competition environment. But on matter the environment, the changing of chairman and general manager are not conducive to improve the performance.3. From the point of controlling shareholders on executive incentive, although, executive compensation and corporate performance present a significant positive correlation, but the coefficient is too small. And compared to the low competition environment, the effect of equity incentive to the board of directors is better under the high competition environment.The effect of equity incentive to executives is obvious in the companies of decentralized shareholding under the high competition environment, and the companies of decentralized shareholding and relative shareholding under the low competition environment.4. From the point of controlling shareholders on the control of the board of supervisors,the shareholding proportion of supervisors is significantly positively related with corporate performance under the low competition environment; especially the companies of relative shareholding, but under the high competition environment, the market regulation weaken the function of supervisors. In addition, the effect of controlling shareholder control of the supervisors is not obvious, but the overall trend is conducive to improve corporate performance.Thus, through the empirical research this paper finds the most suitable control structure for the state-owned listed companies under different industry competition environment, and the controlling shareholder’s governance behavior really influence the corporate performance.So, the state-owned listed companies should optimize the controlling shareholder’s governance behavior according the different industry competition environment to improve its competitiveness.