Study On The Impact Of Non-state Capital Entry On The Governance Performance Of Competitive State-owned Listed Companies

In recent years,with the proposal of the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to actively develop the mixed ownership economy,the reform of mixed ownership in China has been deepening,and more and more non-state-owned capital has come into the state-owned enterprises,which has become an important force in realizing the reform of state-owned enterprises.With the deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises,classified promotion has gradually become the principle and direction of the reform,and competitive state-owned enterprises have become the first pioneers of the reform.Under this wave of mixed ownership reform,whether competitive state-owned enterprises can improve their corporate governance performance by introducing non-state-owned capital becomes a crucial issue.Firstly,this paper combs the research results related to corporate governance performance of mixed ownership reform in China and abroad.Under the guidance of property rights theory,principal-agent theory and stakeholder theory,it analyses the current situation of mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises in China,and probes into the problems existing in the current reform of mixed ownership in China.Secondly,on the basis of theoretical analysis,the research hypothesis is put forward.Taking competitive state-owned listed companies with non-state-owned capital entry in the period of 2013-2018 as the research object,the relationship between non-state-owned capital entry and corporate governance performance is empirically studied from two perspectives of corporate performance and social responsibility fulfillment.The study finds that due to the effective integration of state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned capital in the short term,the entry of non-state-owned capital has a significant positive impact on the market performance of competitive state-owned listed companies,and a significant negative impact on the financial performance of competitive state-owned listed companies;the degree of control has a regulation on the relationship between the entry of non-state-owned capital and the performance of competitive state-owned listed companies.The absolute state-owned holding has a stronger moderating effect on the relationship than the relative holding;the entry ofnon-state-owned capital has a significant negative impact on the fulfillment of social responsibility of competitive state-owned listed companies;the relationship between non-state-owned capital entry and social responsibility of competitive state-owned listed companies has a more significant negative correlation in the relative holding situation than in the absolute holding situation.Finally,according to the research conclusions,the following countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to improve the policy of mixed ownership reform and improve the governance performance of competitive state-owned listed companies:establish and improve the relevant laws,regulations and supporting policies of mixed ownership reform,strengthen the synergy and precision of supporting policies;improve the modern enterprise system,improve the corporate governance structure;improve the process of introducing non-state capital,and prevent the risk of introducing non-state capital.