Research About Governance Mode Reform Of The State-owned Commercial Banksfrom The Perspective Of Principal-agent Theory

As the main body of our country’s banking industry, the state-owned commercial banks play a very important role in the national economy and made a great contribution in promoting the industrial restructuring. The competitive power, the management state and management level of the state-owned commercial banks, not only matters to their own future, but also related to the financial security, the economic security, and even the social stability of the country. In China, the modern financial enterprise managing structure has not been established in the state-owned commercial banks at present The old system with strong administrative color cannot meet the needs of the modern market economy. The reform of the governance mode of the state-owned commercial banks brooks no delay.This paper is about the governance mode reform of the state-owned commercial banks through the methods of finance, economics and management from the perspective of principal-agent theory. Firstly, the generation and meaning of corporate governance theory, and the principal-agent theory are discussed. And concluded that corporate governance is an incomplete principal-agent contract. Secondly, review the governance mode reform process of the Chinese state-owned commercial banks in three periods; and analyze the basic governance framework in Chinese state-owned commercial banks and its special operating mechanism. Thirdly, analyze the defects of the governance mode of Chinese state-owned commercial banks, and the causes of defects from the perspective of principal-agent theory. Finally, compare with the different governance models of commercial banks in developed countries, and then put forward countermeasures that suits the national condition of China to improve the governance mode of state-owned commercial bank.