Research On The Governance Of Chinese State—Owned Commercial Bank

Chinese state-owned commercial bank,is the subject of the national economy,the development of the national economy plays a very important role.Good management and competitiveness of state-owned commercial banks for the stable and secure financial social order plays an active role.State-owned commercial addition of state-owned banks play in the government's macro-control in a key role,such as the implementation of the country's monetary policy to regulate the market,the implementation of quasi-fiscal functions of the stability of national development,the key position of state-owned commercial banks based government has given business special protection and comprehensive supervision of banks.But modern financial corporate governance structure at this stage of the state-owned commercial banks is not perfect.Due to historical reasons precipitation,governance of state-owned commercial banks still have a certain stroke color,in today's market economy,the major state-owned commercial banks have completed the shareholding reform,the principal-agent problem in state-owned commercial banks have become increasingly prominent in corporate governance,the study of state-owned Commercial Bank governance model has practical and theoretical significance is very important.Asymmetric information theory agency relationship is assumed that the premise of this article,this article from the agency's point of view,the relationship between the agency and state-owned commercial bank governance issues were analyzed in the presence,among the state-owned commercial banks and the government,its interior,among its clients,to analyze the relationship between the agency and the problem of these three areas,and banks in developed countries governance model overview and comparison,and then established the model of governance of state-owned commercial banks in order to deepen understanding of the principal-agent problem.China has some of this research,but less from the perspective of agency theory to study the state-owned commercial bank governance model of the article,this article has deepened over the previous results obtained.Inadequacies of this article is not deep enough for the study of principal-agent relationship of state-owned commercial banks,state-owned banks to improve the governance structure of countermeasures is not enough refinement.Therefore,this article is a contribution to the status quo with Chinese state-owned commercial banks to agency theory as a tool,the current situation of Chinese commercial banks governance model analysis and mathematical model of a state-owned commercial bank governance on how to improve the existing system of governance of state-owned commercial banks from the establishment of a sound salary system,establish long-term incentive pay system both incentive system,and establish a good bank's internal and external competition mechanism,improve the bank's internal information and organization of internal supervision mechanism three aspects put forward the corresponding line with Chinese current situation policy suggestion.So this healthy development of Chinese state-owned commercial banks have a certain theoretical and practical significance.