| Venture capital investment was introduced in China in the1980’s. Along with the rapid growth of China’s economy, venture capital industry has made great development. According to the survey report of China venture capital industry in2008, the scale of new fund-raising venture capital market reached101.8billion Yuan, with a growth of14%compared with2007.As an significant form of investment, venture capital is not only conducive to the promotion of technological innovation, especially the small and medium-sized enterprise of science and technology innovation, but also has positive influence on the regional financial innovation and the development of capital market.A wave of entrepreneurship is rising in China, but financing difficulty is one of the bottlenecks which restrict the development of venture capital in China. The time of creation of a new science and technology enterprise is short, the specificity of intangible asset is high, the business prospects are uncertain, so investment contracts are incomplete. The traditional principal-agent theory of the financing contract can not effectively solve the problem of moral hazard and the conflict on interest between entrepreneurs and risk investors. It also inhibits the development of venture capital industry. With the rising of the theory of control rights, the factor of control rights is introduced to analyze contracts.The method of this research is purely theoretical. This paper constructs several models to solve the contract problem which has random natural state in the middle term of an investment project. These models use the idea of "state contingent control rights allocation" from the third chapter, and emphasizes the optimization of enterprise internal control rights allocation of financing both sides to realize incentive compatibility. In the final section5.2, we can see that the idea of allocation of control rights was widely proved.The model part of this paper is from the second chapter.Section2.1introduces a basic model which describes a fixed investment projects. Entrepreneur’s action in the stage of moral hazard can not be observed. The optimal contract should take consideration of the entrepreneur’s incentive, it also can ensure the adequacy of the income.Section2.2adds the premise that the control rights of whether to take enhancing action in the mid-term of the project should be allocated, contract to distribute the profits improve things in control action. The conclusion can be summarized that if the lack of income is ensured, entrepreneurs have to transfer the control rights to investors, and the interests of entrepreneurs for financing opportunities will sacrifice.The section2.3breaks the independence of mid-term actions and incentive in section2.1and2.2.The conclusion is contrary to section2.2:if the control of mid-term action will promote the conscientious behavior incentive, and the guaranteed income of the project is insufficient, transferring control rights to the entrepreneur may still be the best.The model of section2.4is changed into multi-dimensional based on the model of section2.1.Investors and entrepreneurs build a contract to allocate control rights of all dimensions. The conclusion is very simple, if a pair of project impact action, income relative to its cost is too small, then the control rights should be left to the entrepreneur.The3.1section brings a random signal in the mid-term of the project into the model. As long as information in the signal reflects the entrepreneur’s unobservable action before the signal, optimal allocation of control rights should depend on the mid-term signal, because the entrepreneur’s diligent behavior can be indirectly showed.The model of section3.2amended the premise of the signal. At the same time, the information which the random signal convey is correct. The3.4section on the basis of section3.2, the information the signal conveys expands into two-dimensional, i.e. project liquidation value and entrepreneur alternative opportunity value.The model of section3.3fixes the form of signal from "information" into "income", and draws similar conclusions from the last section. Further more, section3.3stressed that if the profit may not be verified by a third party, the optimal contract should be build with the theory of securities design.The fourth chapter introduced the idea of security design based on models of chapter3. The principle thought is that if the distribution of signal depends on entrepreneur’s behavior. Even when mid-term profits cannot be verified by a third party, we can also design an entrepreneur incentive contract. However not all cases based on securities designed to motivate entrepreneurs are optimal, the4.1section separately discusses the incentive scheme feasible paths of action of two kinds of entrepreneurs, and compared.The model in section4.3could be regarded as an expanded version from the model of section4.1.It assume that the distribution of mid-term income is continuous, and entrepreneur’s action in the first period decides the distribution of mid-term profits. In this case we can still get a similar conclusion from section3.3.The model in section5.1is the general structure this problem. Fusion:the entrepreneur moral risk, rely on entrepreneurs’ actions multidimensional signal, multidimensional control rights, governance structure, entrepreneurs and investors to the relative bargaining power and other factors.The characteristic of this paper is:the method of research is purely theoretical. All models are based on a basic framework(fixed investment model with the constraint of initial wealth). The difference is revealed by details of the models, and then draw different aspects of the conclusion. The first section of the fifth chapter,the general conclusion, put forward an abstract framework, which covers the hypothesis of the10models from chapter2to chapter4. It provides a general planning problem of the form. The general model has important significance in methodology, because it provides guidelines for specific modeling. |
PDF Full Text Request