| Berle and Means first discovered the phenomenon of "separation of ownership and control," the dispersion in equity companies, and analyzes the agency problems arising from this phenomenon. However, after the1980s, it was discovered that most of the countries and regions in the company there is the phenomenon of concentration of ownership, ownership concentration is the most cost effective way to solve the agency problem between shareholders and management, as the largest shareholder ownership concentration makes more concerned about maximizing profits, thereby strengthening the supervision and management of the company, to suppress selfish behavior management, maintaining the value of the company. However, the concentration of ownership would adversely affect that controlling shareholders may be for personal gain and wanton manipulation control over its possession to the appropriate company resources or seek benefits not available to other shareholders, to the detriment of the interests of other minority shareholders. Therefore, the main problem is no longer a corporate governance research agency problems between management and shareholders, but the controlling shareholder agency problems with other small shareholders. Since then, La Porta et al studied the first question about the ultimate control over the separation of control rights and cash flow rights of the ultimate controlling company achieved through pyramid structures, cross-shareholdings and ultra-right shares, etc., further exacerbating the controlling shareholder and agency problems of minority shareholders.Previous studies showed that the situation of China’s listed company focused on equity is also very common. In China, the dominant state-owned listed companies, only a few family-controlled companies. Most of these state-owned listed companies from the former state-owned enterprise reform, we can not be implemented in a person or a family, it’s just the country’s principal equity only, represents the interests of all the people. This will lead to a substantial shareholder of SOEs managers lack of effective supervision, more supervision may be borne by the minority shareholders, due to lack of supervision, the actual ruler as a corporate manager might grab unfair to their own interests and made improper business decisions, control rights and cash flow rights separation makes this behavior more motivation and ability. Therefore, the state-owned enterprises,"the separation of ownership and management," agency problems arising with the agency problem "control rights and cash flow rights separation" generated by equally prominent.In the market economy, full and effective exchange of information is a key factor in social and economic development. Financial report as the primary means of information disclosure, maintain and develop the relationship between the company and its relevant interest groups, improve the capital market, and promote the efficient allocation of resources has played an important role. The basic objective of financial reporting is to present and potential information users provide accounting information to help their economic decisions. This decision usefulness of information equivalent to the concept of the usefulness of the information content. To a certain extent, the accounting information must be accepted and trusted by investors in order to have value, failing that, the company spent a lot of effort in preparing the financial statements, and to hire auditors to audit, the work will not make any sense.Since the information content of financial information must have in order to reflect the value, then the accounting earnings of state-owned listed companies whether the information content of it? Chinese state-owned enterprises have concentrated ownership situation exists, then the ultimate controlling person from the perspective of whether the agency problems of control and cash flow generated by the separation of ownership and the information content of accounting earnings would affect it? Based on this, based on the control characteristics of the state-owned listed companies, state-owned listed companies to select the sample to20%for the standard control, trying to answer the following questions:whether a state-owned listed company earnings information content? The ultimate controlling shareholder of listed companies have cash flow has what impact on earnings information content? The degree of separation of control rights and cash flow rights have what effect? Other equity checks whether the constraint will play the role of the controlling shareholder, equity restriction with what impact on earnings information content? According to the above problem, we made several assumptions.To test these hypotheses, the author selects2009to2012A-share listed state-owned companies as the sample of empirical analysis. The empirical results show that:the state-owned listed companies with earnings information content, changes in stock prices and earnings did not expect a significant positive correlation; cash flow right information content positively correlated with earnings, cash flow rights, the higher the earnings information content; Control rights and cash flow rights separation exacerbate agency problems controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, so that the information content of earnings decline; Finally, Blockholders negatively correlated with earnings information content, which may be due to the large shareholders for control of competing with each other to make operating conditions decline, or because the ultimate controller of the state-owned listed companies resulted in a lack of effective supervision of other large shareholders actual power, the other private shareholders who actually play the role of control caused. Therefore, to optimize the ownership structure of state-owned listed companies, state-owned direct path increases and institutional investors holding should be a surplus of state-owned enterprises can effectively improve the information content. |
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