The Channel Conflict And Control Research Of Dual-Channel Retail Enterprise

With the development of information technology, the network as a media of channel becomes more mature. Currently, the way of shopping Online has become equal to traditional for consumers. The mixed marketing channel based on network has gradually become the main way for enterprises to expand existing sales channels. However, in this new situation, enterprises in the supply chain system will face a series of channel conflict and competition. The main contradiction of channel conflict is the allocation of optimal sales ratio and price.In the paper, we use the theory and research methods of managerial economics, marketing and game theory, to study the optimal sales and price under different structures. The research of this paper starts from the perspective of retailer, select four typical channel structures and analysis of each from simple to complex. In structure I, there is one supplier, one retailer, the retailer has a dual-channel. At this point, there is a game between the retailer and supplier about the wholesale price, while there’s some interference between retailers’ two channels. Retailer is in a central position, and he has no focus on two channels. Find tangent point of retailer’s sales possibilities curve、the relative price line、consumers spending budget line and consumers indifference curve to get the optimal market share and sales price of each channel. In structure Ⅱ, the retailer has a dual-channel and the supplier opens up a direct sales channel, and they express as a Co-opetition relationship. Through the market profit maximization to match the ratio of sales volume and selling price of each channel, but in the dynamic practice a particular channel of retailer and supplier will gradually show certain comparative advantages, then produce a division of labor, namely, the supplier network channel advantage is large,will pay attention to the network channel management and advantage of retailer’s traditional channels is large, will give priority with traditional channels management, network management is complementary. In structure Ⅲ, the two retailers have dual channels. We discuss the ratio of sales volume in each channel of retailers. Analyze a retailer bending demand curve to get retailers’ price drops is more harm than good. By analysis the reaction curve of the two retailers to get that retailers must consider other’s changes in the price reaction, so two retailers are not easily take price drops or price raise strategy. On the basis of the structure Ⅲ, the supplier in structure IV adds a direct network marketing channel. The channel conflict in this structure includes the conflict in the former several structures. The paper analyze sales volume and price conditions among supplier, target retailer and competition retailer in the case of non-cooperation and cooperation, and gets that their sales price increases under the cooperation case. Competition makes power and status among market participants to become relatively balance. The strong retailer or supplier will not appear, and commodity prices will be roughly equal between the channels, consumer surplus will increase, and the social welfare will improve overall.Finally, the last part of this paper we selected two products which are in the sale on both Gome and Suning’s dual-channels, compare prices changes and analysis pricing strategy of retailers in each channel over a period of time. We get the eventually actions of retailers will act in structure Ⅲ and structure IV, that is, with increased competition, prices between various channels will gradually converge, the price decline, total sales increase, consumer surplus increases and the entire social welfare increase.