The Game Analysis Of Real Estate Mortgage Appraisal

At present, in the real estate appraisal industry the violations operation of the real estateappraisal institutions is widespread. The overrated real estate, which is a hidden danger for thereal estate market, not only seriously damages the credibility of the real estate appraisalindustry, but also improves the bank’s financial risks greatly. Therefore, the real estatemortgage appraisal work is of great significance for the banks to prevent financial risks and topromote the development of the real estate market.First of all, standing at the point of inhibiting the violations operation of the appraiser,this paper analyzes the theoretical incentive and the economics essence of the violationsoperation of the real estate appraisal institutions, and concludes that there is possibility oflong-term cooperation between the banks and the real estate appraisal institutions. Secondly,in the principal-agent relationship between the banks and the real estate appraisal institutions,this paper constructs two cooperation models, namely the long-term cooperation model underthe market feedback effects and the cooperation game model under the bank’s supervision,which aims to reveal the features and rules of the real estate mortgage appraisal behavior, andfind the theoretical sources of inhibiting the violations operation of the real estate appraisalinstitutions. In addition, this paper analyzes the game model between the mortgager and thereal estate appraisal institution under the supervision of the bank, and sums up the key factorsof inhibiting the violations operation of the real estate appraisal institutions. Through thecomparative analysis of the hybrid strategies, we find that penalizing the appraisalinstitution’s overvaluation-appraisal will reduce the probability of mortgager’s cheat in thelong term, which can decrease the bank’s mortgage risks. Punishing the mortgager’s cheatwill increase the appraisal institutions’ overvaluation-appraisal in the long run. On this basis,this paper designs the real estate appraisal guarantee mechanism, which conforms to theincentive compatibility principle, in order to reduce the bad debt losses of the bank.