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Empiricalanalysis Of Corporate Governance Impact On Cash Dividends

Posted on:2015-03-10Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:B ZhuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2309330467958757Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Dividend policy with financing decisions, investment decisions by academics recognizedthe financial operations of the three most important core. Dividend policy not only affect thecompany’s financing arrangements, and influence the choice of the shareholders of theinvestment projects, dividend policy and therefore the focus of investor concern the companyis also listed. China’s stock market is established under the State-owned enterprise reform anddevelop this historical background, compared to listed companies in other countries, theagency problem is more complex, and cause China’s listed companies and foreign dividendpolicy differences. Studies have shown that cross-listed companies face different institutionalenvironment is perfect and complement the corporate governance, the study of cross-listedcompanies corporate governance impact on dividend policy, capital market system to furtherimprove our environment has important significance.Firstly, the domestic and international corporate governance on cash dividends werereviewed literature, combing the theory of corporate governance and dividend policy. On thisbasis, from the agent theory, put forward the hypothesis of listed companies’ corporategovernance and dividend policy and empirical research model was constructed to2008-2011years of "A+H" cross-listed companies as samples, through these the company’s cashdividend and corporate governance for statistical analysis, cross-examined the impact ofcorporate governance of listed companies on the cash dividend, to verify the impact ofcorporate governance under different institutional environments on cash dividend policy.The empirical results show that: first, the degree of cross-listed companies with equitybalances Cash dividends significant positive correlation. Cross-listed company that is thegreater degree of equity restriction, other shareholders oversee the largest shareholder, thelargest shareholder of preventing other investors against the stronger the tendency, in the fightfor their own interests from encroachment, while the objective is also indirectly protects thesmall the interests of shareholders, which is "A" shares of listed companies regression resultsopposite. Second, the management stake cross-listed companies positively correlated with thedistribution of cash dividends. Management’s expectations could be because the proxyconflict mitigation and return on equity investors, to get more support from investors, in orderto facilitate its display management, improve the overall value of the company’s behavior,which is similar to the "A" shares of listed companies regression results.
Keywords/Search Tags:Cash dividend, corporate governance, agency problem
PDF Full Text Request
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