Executive Compensation Incentive,Risking

Executive compensation has always been an important issue in the study ofcorporate governance, how to design a reasonable executive compensation incentivesystem, make the executive better to create wealth for shareholders, to achievemaximize shareholder wealth, has always been the focus of the management todiscuss. Based on the background of the listing Corporation, we studied therelationship between executive compensation incentive, risk-taking and enterpriseperformance.On the basis of the relevant research results at home and abroad,conduct acomprehensive review of the relevant concepts and theories in-depth study, first of all,we analyzed the relationship between executive compensation incentive, risk-takingand proposed research hypothesis. Secondly, sifting through the data, finally we gotthe sample data of322listed companies in2004-2013, used the scientific methods ofmathematical statistics to explore the relationship between executive compensationincentive, risk-taking and enterprise performance, and analyzed the impact path modelamong the three. Thirdly, we draw the following conclusions: executive monetaryincentive and risk-taking, enterprise performance are positively correlated, equityincentives and risk-taking does not pass the hypothesis test, nor is equity incentiveand enterprise performance. Risk-taking in executive plays a role of intermediarybetween monetary incentive and enterprise performance. Finally, through the study ofthesis, we put forward the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions. This studydeepens the understanding of the relationship between compensation incentive andenterprise value, as well as the effectiveness of China’s listed company executivecompensation contract design provides reference value.