Does Executive Compensation Stickiness Increase Enterprises Risk-taking Or Decrease Enterprises Risk-taking

In practice,the compensation contracts of listed companies often have the situation of "rewarding the good rather than punishing the bad",which is the stickiness of executive compensation discussed in this paper.On the one hand,the stickiness may weaken the constraint and incentive effect of the compensation contract,thus reducing the risk-taking of the enterprise.On the other hand,stickiness may also provide executives with tolerance for risk-taking failures and increase their self-confidence level,and executives will likely be more inclined to make risky decisions.There is also no consistent finding in the existing literature on the relationship between them.Based on this,this paper conducts a series of studies.This study reaserches Chinese A share listed enterprises from 2010 to 2014,and reach some conclusions by regression:(1)executive compensation stickiness decreases enterprises risk-taking;(2)the negative effect of executive compensation stickiness on corporate risk-taking is only significant in state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises that chairman and CEO are the same person;(3)the effect of executive compensation stickiness on corporate risk-taking varies by type of contract;(4)executive compensation stickiness promotes R&D investment and debt financing,but also inhibits management activities,indicating that executive compensation stickiness does not negatively affect all economic activities of enterprises.Executive compensation stickiness negatively affects the risk-taking level of firms because the negative effect is greater than the positive effect.The positive effect still exists in some economic activities of enterprises,and not all types of compensation contracts inhibit risk-taking.