The Uitimate Ownership,Industry Competition And Corporate Performance

Under the background of emerging and institutional transition, great importance had been attached to the issue of the reform of state-owned enterprises, whatever the academic group or practice. Different from the private enterprises or the locally-administered state enterprises, central enterprises generally spread over cornerstone industry which is greatly influenced by the public policy, which results in the objective existence of government influence in their productive activities. At the same time, central enterprises also devote to build modern corporate system to keep up with the process of SOE market-oriented reform. As a result, the central enterprises are influenced by the combined effect of the central government and the market impact. Recently, with the expansion of the scale, a series of merger and reorganization made central enterprises further competitive field, meanwhile, the performance frequently Waterloo. As the strategic resource, the central enterprises holding listing corporation’s performance fell sharply three years in row, which is widely criticized. So, what is the impact of the central enterprises performance?Under the classical theory of the firm, Ownership structure is the foundation of corporate governance theory, and the research of which has been continuing up to now, while the opinions are divergent. Through the theoretical analysis and the empirical results of the literature review, this paper considers the nature of enterprise property rights and the external market environment are two important factors that influence performance, based on which, analyses the special nature of property rights and ownership arrangement in the central enterprises holding listing corporation, study the idea of the ultimate ownership and its realization, as well as the separation effect in the realizing process, and then empirically test the relationship between the arrangement of the ultimate ownership and the corporate performance in different industry competition environment, so as to provide some suggestion to the newly reform of SOE. The paper consists of six parts:The first part is the introduction. By combining practical problems of the central enterprises holding listing corporation in the process of the reform of state owned enterprises, this paper raise study significance, propose the framework and main content, describes the limitation and shortcomings as well as the research direction in future.The second part is literature review. This paper points out the development and status of ultimate ownership theory, and then sort out the literature review on the relationship between ultimate ownership and performance from the angle of the concentration of ownership, property rights, agent layer and the separation of the two rights. Further, this paper take the industry competition into consideration.The third part is theoretical analysis and assumption. On the basis of the classical firm theory, this paper analyses the special ownership arrangement in the central enterprises holding listing corporation, discuss the governmental ultimate control and its realization, as well as the separation of two rights in the realizing process, and then build hypothesis.The fourth part is the empirical design. On the basis of theoretical analysis in Chapter three, this section contains variable design, sample selection, and model construction.The fifth section is the empirical test. This section includes descriptive statistics of performance of the central enterprises holding listing corporation in different competition environment and control level, then Pearson correlation and multiple regression of the relationship between the performance and the ownership structure. Finally, is the robustness test.Last, the sixth section is about the empirical conclusion and suggestions. According to the empirical result, this paper draw conclusions and based on which construct the central enterprises classified supervision policy map.The conclusion of this paper rich the study results about the arrangement of the ownership of the ultimate controller. Some of the innovation points should be put forward. Firstly, based on the different conclusion of present study between the ultimate control right concentration and corporate performance, this paper start from the internal special arrangement of ownership and external special market position caused by the nature of the property rights of the central holding enterprises listing corporation and find the U type relationship. Secondly, differ from the existing opinion that increasing agent layer in SOE help improve corporate performance, this paper find this efficiency promotion is just established in highly-competitive industries. Finally, this paper find that in in highly-competitive industries, proper separation of ownership and control plays a promoting role in the corporate performance.While, because of the indirection of the data and the limitation of the research capabilities, this paper divided the industry competition only consider the listing corporation in the industry. Although it has certain representation, it still cannot accurately describe industry competition pattern. In addition, the central enterprises holdings listing Corporation’s ultimate control right structure needs further study, take an example, the main exercise of different nature subject should be taken into consideration. All these problems should be studied in depth in a follow-up research.