Empirical Research On Ultimate Ownership Structure And Corporate Performance Based On Chinese Listed State-owned Manufacturing Enterprises' Data

La porta,Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer(1999)groundbreaking put forward the concept of ultimate controlling shareholders, and claim to find enterprises' ultimate controlling shareholders by tracing stock control chain. Their empirical paper tests out ultimate controlling shareholders exist in many developed countries, and they make a thorough study of the relationship with corporate performance. Since then the relationship between ultimate ownership structure and corporate performance has become the mainstream of the research direction of corporate governance.Therefore this paper attempts to use the research methods of La porta et al from the angle of ultimate controlling shareholders, selects the data of 293 listed state-owned manufacturing enterprises of Hu-shen stock market in 2006-2009 as research samples, finds the listed enterprise's real ultimate controlling shareholder through tracing the control chain, and adopts several statistical methods to empirical test the relationship among the ultimate control right, the cash flow right, the separation of two rights and the corporate performance. The following conclusions are drawn:(1)The relationship between the ultimate control and the corporate performance is none-liner: a converse N shape. When the proportion of the control right is below 25.64%,the enterprise performs " Entrenchment effect "; when the proportion is between 25.64% and 61%, the enterprise performs "Alignment effect"; and when the proportion exceeds 61%, the enterprise performs "Entrenchment effect "again.(2)The enterprise performs better as the proportion of the ultimate control shareholder's cash flow right increases. It means the proportion of cash flow right produces the positive impact on corporate performance. And the ultimate control shareholder has higher motive to supervise management. It plays a positive "Incentive effect" and enhances the corporate performance. (3)The result of descriptive statistics has indicated the separate degree of two rights is not high in China's state-owned companies, because the phenomenon exists in 32.59% companies, but it does not appear in 67.41% companies. The separation rate of two rights has significant influence on corporate performance under 10% and 20% control standard, but the impact is positive, and the hypothesis is not supported. The possible reason is the sample selected from the state-owned manufacturing enterprise, however, Chinese unique situation is that the ultimate control shareholder represents the government not the legal person. Therefore, the ultimate control shareholders of China's listed state-owned manufacturing play a helping-hand role not grab-hand role as other countries.(4)Simultaneously, this paper has also tested the size, the capital structure, the proportion of the independent directors and growth has affected on corporate performance. To be specific, the company size and growth has produced significant positive impact on corporate performance; and the capital structure and the proportion of the independent directors has produced significant negative impact on corporate performance.The result of this paper explores how to optimize the ownership structure, perfect the corporate governance structure, raise the corporate performance, promote state-owned enterprise reformation and the enterprise long-term health development, and further to protect the interests of small-sized and medium-sized shareholders, promote capital market and national economic development. It will be theoretical and practical.