The Game Theory Analysis On Chinese Refined Oil Pricing Mechanism Reform In The Poliy Network Perspective

Since reform and opening up, with the further development of our country’s economy, the consumption of refined oil is increasing year by year, The scale of China’s refined oil market is continually expanding. Although China’s refined oil pricing mechanism experience many reforms, the non-market refined oil pricing mechanism is still in dispute. There are too many to count studies. Refined oil price fluctuations affect the interests of many people. However, in the process of relevant policy making and implementation, the interest game between participants on the influence of the policy objectives needs to be analyzed.As a new theory of public policy, policy network theory is mainly used in the management of public policy and research. The theory provides a new theoretical model and analysis method to study the relationship between the multiple stakeholders in the process of public policy formulation and implementation. The game theory point of view, policy making and implementation is actually a political bargaining process. The realization of objectives depends on the efficient interaction of policy makers, policy implementers and the target groups. However, in China’s refined oil market, the participants in order to pursue the maximization of their own interests, and finally lead to the deviation in the execution of the policy.Based on the policy network theory and game theory, this article discusses the reform process of China’s refined oil pricing mechanism, first of all, Analyze the applicability of the policy network theory in the reform process of China’s refined oil pricing mechanism. Secondly, using the Rhodes model of policy network theory for participants in the reform process of China’s refined oil pricing mechanism has carried on the classification. Again, using the game theory to establish the related model, analyzes the behavior choice of participants in the reform process of oil pricing mechanism. Then we get the following conclusions:The reform process of China’s refined oil pricing mechanism is a game process of multiple subjects; The interaction between participants of the policy network can affect the results; The policy network which is formed in the reform process of China’s refined oil pricing mechanism has dynamic adjustment function. Finally, According to the problem of China’s current refined oil pricing mechanism put forward reform proposals.